Playing to the Tune of Electracy: From Post-Process to a Pedagogy Otherwise

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> From Plato to the present, one of the invidious tests for whether or not a notion or practice has any value is to determine whether it can be generalized (is generic) and whether it is transferable (codifiable, teachable). If not, usually the assumption is that there is no method but merely a knack, an irrationality that is left to the forces of chance.
>
> —Victor Vitanza

> We must enter in the space of amnesia, of phantom pain, and ask some cold titanium questions. Is it enough to resist seeing composition and the computer as tools of empowerment or to resist seeing technology as a threat to autonomy? Or is it time to risk the final amputation of a decaying pedagogy?
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> —Cynthia Haynes

As one of the field's enduring areas of contention, the rift between theory and practice in rhetoric and composition still elicits strong response and creates distressing separations between "irresponsible," "faddish" theory and "responsible," "real-life" practice. At an innovative panel discussion at the 2005 Conference on College Composition and Communication convention, Gregory Ulmer explained the importance of understanding the apparatus out of which our theories and practices emerge. The apparatus, he contended, has to do with technologies, identity formations, and institutions at work within a given time and

place. The apparatus of print currently drives how we think about and interact with our world in and out of the academy, and, Ulmer suggested, is slowly being transformed (not eclipsed) by the emergence of a new apparatus built around "electracy." The concept of electracy might hastily be associated with electronic literacy; however, and as Ulmer was quick to point out, electracy has less to do with literacy (a concept—no matter how many time is has been redefined—fundamentally tied to print and values inherent in print) and more to do with a combination of the concepts of "electricity" and "trace." Both of these concepts can begin to take us out of the apparatus of print and work to describe the logic and metaphors we use in a culture built upon images. Electracy emphasizes a multiplicity of meanings for any one concept, supports imagination, and encourages creativity and invention: all of which are traditionally not valued in a university environment built upon analytics. Ulmer called for us to become more aware of the emerging apparatus of electracy—which started with the invention of photography and continues today with digital technology—and encouraged us to intervene in its emergence. Our intervention will help invent and shape the new apparatus as it is unfolding; our intervention will show how the distance between theory and practice collapses in an electrate apparatus, and this is why the electrate apparatus serves as an appropriate site for rethinking the field's relationship to theory. Ulmer emphasized that we might intervene in the new apparatus best by helping to invent a rhetoric for electracy. I hope to contribute to this task by first revisiting and reexamining the theory/practice split that still plagues our field and then offering alternatives that are better suited for electracy.

Post-Process Pedagogy? Looking (Back) to Vitanza and Kent

As we already know, the matter of *using* a theory to improve classroom practice is an age-old point of contention—and, I believe, a product of the apparatus of print. However, over the past few years, it has been brought back to the forefront with what has been referred to as *post-process theory*. One of the major debates surrounding post-process theory has to do with whether or not this set of theoretical assumptions has any real implications for classroom practice. This debate is aptly demonstrated throughout an exchange in which Gary Olson and Thomas Kent respond

to Lee-Ann M. Kastman Breuch's essay, "Post-Process 'Pedagogy': A Philosophical Exercise." The larger issue that emerges from this exchange questions the significance of making a necessary separation between theory and pedagogy. What ensues is a fitting and timely example of how discussions about theory and pedagogy in rhetoric and composition (despite occurring throughout the past several decades) still rely on outdated assumptions created for a different time, space, and apparatus. For instance, a specific question that emerges is whether or not *post-process theory* is "mature" enough to be *turned into* a pedagogy or to even generate pedagogical insights, since it has emerged only in the past few years (see Breuch 140; Dobrin).

The idea that theories should mature before being applicable to practice is part of the apparatus of print and literacy. For electracy, and as I will explain in the latter sections of this article, this notion changes from "turning" a theory into practice to *practicing the theory as it is emerging*. And it is important to note that practicing a theory as it is emerging will not reduce or compromise its legitimacy. Breuch claims that pedagogical implications are indeed found in post-process theory even though they are not highlighted in a "productive" way (127). She thus proceeds to explicate how, exactly, *post-process theory* is more aptly understood as *post-process pedagogy*, since proponents of post-process theory, such as Kent and Dobrin, "are not specific enough to outline any pedagogy that could be labeled 'post-process,' thus increasing the resistance to applying post-process theory to pedagogy" (124). Breuch's characterization of post-process theory as "not specific enough" is predicated on the assumption (embedded in the apparatus of literacy) that, in order to be relevant and legitimate in the discipline of rhetoric and composition, new theories must have evident and clear links to pedagogy, hence her deliberate name change from *theory* to *pedagogy*.

Alongside Breuch's explication of post-process theories, and backing up several years, we can see that this very discussion also occurs in Victor Vitanza's "Three Countertheses: Or, A Critical In(ter)vention into Composition Theories and Pedagogies," particularly in his third counterthesis. The third counterthesis responds directly to the shift occurring at the time from *inner-directed* (expressive, cognitive, and

foundational) to *outer-directed* (social-epistemic and antifoundational) theories and practices. The problem questions the possibility or impossibility of a "stable topology" that can be known, communicated throughout the discipline, and taught to students (160). Vitanza's response is still very valid, especially in light of the aforementioned attempt to necessarily "apply" post-process theory. Interestingly, Vitanza and the post-process theorists (particularly Kent) appear to be advocating similar ideas and even, at times, use some of the same terms. However, there are distinct differences on which I will focus; illuminating these differences will help with the task of inventing the apparatus of electracy and what I will advocate as a "post-critical" composition.

The issues brought forth by both Vitanza and Kent are well known by now, but I believe that rehashing them briefly will shed some light on how we might go about inventing this new apparatus. Kent devises another conceptual scheme for what he calls "internalist" and "externalist" rhetorics (reminiscent of Vitanza's "inner-directed" and "outer-directed"). Internalist rhetorics take "human subjectivity" as "the starting place for every investigation of meaning and language use" (*Paralogic* 98). Thus, Kent places all of the aforementioned rhetorics (expressive, cognitive, social-epistemic, antifoundational) as well as schools of literary criticism (Russian Formalism, Anglo-American New Criticism, Czech structuralism and poststructuralist "concerns" [see *Paralogic* 182 n. 3]) as that which relies on internalist assumptions (see also Davis "Finitude's" 126). He thus argues for an "externalist" rhetoric that claims to:

> Shift from an internalist conception of communicative interaction—the notion that communication is a product of the internal workings of the mind or the workings of the discourse communities in which we live—to an externalist conception that [. . .] would challenge us to drop our current process-oriented vocabulary and to begin talking about our social and public uses of language. (*Paralogic* 169)

This description is linked to one of the central tenets of post-process theory: that "all writing is public" (*Post-Process* 1). Through these claims, we can see that Kent's critique of process theories stems from the assumption that they are inherently "internalist," which, according to

Kent, mistakenly stand as a conceptualized body of knowledge to eventually be mastered and passed on to students without acknowledging the unique communicative act of triangulation always present in communicative interactions. Thus, Kent's externalist pedagogy also endorses the notion that "neither writing nor reading can be reduced to a systemic process or to a codifiable set of conventions" (*Paralogic* 161). These two passages can serve as starting places that link to the third counterthesis. Vitanza explains:

> The third counterthesis states (from a postmodern, "third sophistic" perspective) that theory as the game of knowledge cannot help as a resource, because theory of this sort resists finally being theorized, totalized. [. . .] This third counterthesis is in reference to the third, but modified, proposition of Gorgias (if "it" could be known, it cannot and should not be communicated [that is, taught]). (159)

In light of the debates that I have very briefly introduced, the first section of this article will discuss the third counterthesis and the exchange regarding post-process theory, since both instances rehash the prominence of the theory/practice split in rhetoric and composition by eventually advocating theories that have no apparent link to pedagogy. However, this juxtaposition will also help illuminate the central tenets of the third counterthesis: tenets that are the least understood yet most crucial for what I will advocate as a post-critical composition. I will then turn to describing the methodology of choragraphy as an example of merging theory and practice to produce the third option more viable for electracy: w/hole writing. The final section of this article will extrapolate some recent attempts at practicing w/hole writing and post-critical composition.

Postpedagogy: Inventing/Teaching/Paralogy

> The basic assumption in many of the Socratic dialogues is that to know something, to call it knowledge, one has to be able to teach it, to reproduce the means by which it is transferred to and acquired by another human being.
>
> —Victor Vitanza

As a caveat and a response to the inevitable reaction from "the discipline" in 1991, Vitanza realizes that a "recently proud profession must reject [the third counterthesis] as ridiculous" ("Three" 161). Presently, and over ten years later, the contentions raised by the third counterthesis are ready to be discussed at length, especially in the context of electracy and post-critical composition. The third counterthesis can provide insight into what happens to pedagogy when the conditions, values, and purposes for writing change (which had only begun to be discussed in 1991). The third counterthesis, Vitanza argues, can be "restated (with greater precision) in two other ways, which have an overall immediate, direct relevance to rhetoric and composition and, most important, a direct relevance to pedagogy" (159–60). Vitanza's use of the word "relevance" in relation to pedagogy is crucial, since he will not tell us how to apply the third counterthesis to pedagogy; instead, the third counterthesis will *create the conditions* for thinking about pedagogy in a wholly different manner. The first way to restate the third counterthesis is as follows:

> The first way to restate counterthesis 3 is to declare a moratorium on attempting to turn theory into praxis/pedagogy. The field of composition demonstrates a resistance *to* theory by rushing to apply theory to praxis without ever realizing the resistance *of* theory itself to be theorized and applied. (160)

Declaring a moratorium, however, does not include mourning for that which is lost; the void created by not turning a theory into practice is indeed where practice occurs: the former whole, now a hole, remains a w/hole: constantly reassembled into new combinations by the practitioners involved. The slash between the "w" and the "h" indicates that this kind of writing uses several meanings of the words "whole" and "hole": the trace (recall electracy), so to speak. The "wholeness" of theory and practice should simultaneously be thought of as a perpetual "hole": never to be filled, completed, or "whole" enough to be *turned into* a stable practice. Once a theory is appropriated by theorizing it or applying it, the theory itself resists, unravels, and forges new connections. During this unraveling, elements that had to be excluded in the name of clear communication and teaching eventually return to disrupt the analytical

appropriation or application. Holes appear, and the rush to communicate how the theory works as a Theory, a master narrative, then, again, fills in those holes, only to be unraveled once again. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari further explain theory's resistance to application. They suggest, "Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up." They go on to say, "Every movement passes through the whole of the plane by immediately turning back on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing itself to be folded by them, giving rise to retractions, connections, and proliferations in the fractalization of this infinitely folded up infinity" (*What* 33, 38). "Giving rise" to connections does not entail consciously turning the concept into application; rather, these connections appear and reappear, never completely fitting together, but, by passing through the plane, creating the conditions for the possibility of becoming and learning, which are then disassembled and reassembled into new combinations. "Giving rise" to connections also explains how theory and practice work together simultaneously to produce something new.

When Breuch claims that post-process theory does indeed have direct links to pedagogy, she searches for explicit examples where it has been applied most appropriately—for example, Bruce McComiskey's "social-process rhetorical inquiry" and Raul Sánchez's one-to-one mentored relationship between teacher and student (qtd. in Breuch 125). These applications, while both very different, are practical "how to" accounts of actual classroom practices stemming from post-process theory. While I would not disagree with Breuch that these different applications are indeed occurring and benefiting students, I would question her quest to demonstrate that, contrary to what its proponents say, post-process theory must necessarily elicit immediate pedagogical application.

In order to make this assertion more specific, I will now spend some time with a passage written by Dobrin in his essay in Kent's collection on post-process theory. Breuch refers to this article in particular, and I believe it aptly echoes some of her concerns and thus deserves more explication. First, however, we should hear Vitanza's second restatement of the third counterthesis:

> The second restatement is that during the moratorium, we will gain time (yes, I'm optimistic!) for enough of us to realize that (critical) theory paradoxically can, but cannot, be employed to critique and to found theoretical praxis. Theory has become, for the field of composition, the will to unified theory (see a nostalgic expression of this will in Bizzell, "On the Possibility"); it has become "theory hope." (Fish "Consequences" 112; also see "Anti-Foundationalism")

The notions of theory hope and antifoundationalism in rhetoric and composition have been centers of debate for the past several years; the debates have generally been focused on three general areas. The first can be summarized as the attempt to turn the theory of antifoundationalism into a pedagogy for teaching writing (see Bizzell, Curry, and Rassmussen). Second, other scholars have argued that doing so results in only "theory hope" (see Gale, S. Jarratt, Smit, and Summerfield), which is summarily dismissed as a futile exercise—or, in Smit's terms, a "hall of mirrors." Finally, some have attempted to see the usefulness of theory in a field that has been historically aligned with practical application (see Daniell, Harkin, Harris, and Olson). Of course, this list is not exhaustive, but I have included it to demonstrate the extent to which these ideas have infiltrated and influenced scholarship in the discipline consistently over the past decade. Instead of explicating these appropriations in terms of the third counterthesis, however, I turn to Dobrin, since his essay is an apt and more current example of trying to maintain "hope" of liberatory (critical, social-epistemic) pedagogy despite the impossibility of a grand narrative or Theory to guide pedagogy.

By linking with Kent's notion that there can never be a "true" definition of a "paralogic hermeneutic pedagogy," Dobrin works from the assumption that Kent's paralogic hermeneutics make it difficult—if not impossible—to design pedagogies for writing. Similar to Breuch, he names several people who have attempted to do so; however, he quickly points out that "upon closer examination, the pedagogies that have been forwarded are actually little more than redesigned radical pedagogies or dialogic pedagogies—pedagogies already accepted in the post-process era" (134). This is important because Dobrin appears to be suggesting that post-process theory will indeed elicit new and codified pedagogies over

time—possibilities that might propel us out of the present dilemma. Hence, Dobrin exclaims,

> As responsible teachers/scholars, we certainly do not want to devalue or dismiss these theories and what they teach us regarding language, writing, and reading simply because they do not offer direct links to pedagogies (as many frequently and ignorantly do). It is difficult for any of us to relinquish the idea that we, as members of the education mechanism, are not forwarding the process of education. The simple proclamation "I teach" is lifted from out repertoire, according to these theories, as the act of teaching is no longer possible. (134)

These statements require careful consideration. First, Dobrin suggests that "responsible" teachers will tune into theories that have no direct link to pedagogy and see them as simply abstract theories from which we can learn but that will remain theoretical. The notion that theory and practice are separate entities could not be stronger with this statement. While Dobrin apparently endorses the idea that in rhetoric and composition theories with no seeming pedagogical application can still be valued, he relies on the notion that once we embrace a "theoretical" leaning, we will then relinquish our commitment to the education mechanism. His declaration concerning the abolishment of the "act of teaching" seems to suggest that if we embrace a theoretical stance, we will no longer "teach" in the traditional sense, and therefore we will not fulfill our duty to be responsible teachers. Thus, Dobrin suggests that we should work with Kent's notion of triangulation, "moments of communication" occurring in "noncodifiable systems"; but, most importantly, we should also identify how power and dominance are furthered by these particular instances of communication (143). Thus, as responsible teachers, this is how we can make a liberating pedagogy work. "I teach" is replaced with the act of triangulation and the subsequent identification of power structures—"the moment of power during communicative interaction"—inherent in this act (146).

This claim is also appropriated and explained by Breuch to mean that eventually, with further theorizing, these theories will elicit more direct links to pedagogy, and the actual scene of teaching might change (moving to more of a tutorial model, for example), but she does not go as far as

Dobrin to suggest that the power inherent in communicative interaction should be the facet that fosters the goals of liberating pedagogy. Like Dobrin, however, Breuch takes literally the post-process claim that writing cannot be taught and equates it with being potentially irresponsible by emphasizing that "post-process theory does not mean an avoidance of the teaching of writing; it does not mean becoming irresponsible teachers" (146). And Kent concurs, echoing the ethical imperative that both Dobrin and Breuch put forth: "Giving up the search for a principled pedagogy will help us all become more responsible teachers" ("Principled" 433). I believe that these ethical imperatives are what keep driving an even stronger wedge between theory and practice. Breuch claims that we are only "responsible" teachers if we search for principles in the theories and then apply them to teaching; Kent claims that we are only "responsible" teachers if we stop doing what Breuch suggests. However, both of these claims of "responsibility" still uphold the belief that presupposes the binary separation of "responsible" practice and "irresponsible" theory, and it is the mission of the writing teacher to be dedicated to responsibility.

These kinds of reductions and accusations of irresponsibility can now be explained in more detail by further elaboration from the third counterthesis. Following Stanley Fish's description of "theory hope" Vitanza thus explains his similar notion of "pedagogy hope."[1] He writes,

> Pedagogy hope has, as its supposed beneficent ends, the improvement of our teaching of composition. [. . .] We hope for improved modes of production (a set of *techne*) to create an improved product; we hope for *arête* (political virtue) that will sustain the capitalist/socialist polis at the expense of the social in the individual. (161)

Moving away from pedagogy hope would be to move from pedagogy to *postpedagogy*: what Vitanza calls "a *pedagogy other(wise)*, what we want is a pedagogy without criteria [. . .] what we desire is a counterpedagogy, which expresses the 'desire to escape to pedagogical imperative: a desire [. . .] to do away with pedagogy altogether'" (161; qtd. from Felman 23; also see Crowley "Perilous"; Berthoff). Doing away with pedagogy, however, does not mean that students will stop coming to

class and that we will no longer teach, thus making us irresponsible. To take this literally, as Dobrin and Breuch have, we would assume that we would no longer be teaching students in universities (or virtually, for that matter) as we do now, that the *act* of teaching is no longer necessary under the conditions being described.

In his reply to Breuch's essay, Olson first states, "It saddens me to hear all the resistance to and mischaracterization (unintentional, I am sure) of post-process theory," and, he adamantly stresses, "nothing pedagogically has changed. What changes is your *own understanding of what you are doing* in the classroom" ("Why" 423, 427; emphasis added). In other words, our practices are inherently implicated in the theories that resonate for us. We are neither doing away with pedagogy by not teaching anymore, nor are we trying to make critical pedagogy work better under these new conditions (that is, one-to-one tutorial situations). Rather, we are doing away with the notion that what we teach and how we teach it are predicated on the codified assumptions of a Theory (legitimized by the discipline) that is first interpreted and then acted upon. Thus, as Vitanza says, a postpedagogy

> realizes legitimization by paralogy. [. . .] As a (para) process, paralogy is contrary to such commonly accepted virtues as control and efficiency. [. . .] For paralogy, the goal is not renovation but innovation; not a stochastic series based on rules that allow us to guess effectively and efficiently but a paradoxical series that invites us to break with the former rules altogether. (165–66)

D. Diane Davis has written extensively about how both Kent (by way of Davidson) and Vitanza (by way of Lyotard) turn to paralogy to help redescribe pedagogy. However, and as she has pointed out, "Kent puts [paralogy] into the service of hermeneutics" and "Lyotard's paralogy, however, aligns itself with a *post* hermeneutic impulse [that] strives to 'impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable'" ("Finitude's" 128–29; also se Lyotard, *Postmodern* 81). Kent links paralogy to guesswork, which has as its end successful interpretation about the meaning of others' utterances. Kent deems this "guesswork" paralogical because "no logical framework, process, or system can predict in advance the efficacy

of our guesses" (*Paralogic* 5). Davis goes on to point out that the difference, then, is that while Kent would have understanding as his "aim," understanding "in an entirely different and rigorous sense [is] Lyotard's [and Vitanza's] target" (129). We can sense the unpresentable but cannot articulate it. *Its sense comes across—"gives rise"—in our actions*, and this is precisely how we can get out of the theory/practice split.

Thus, in terms of the third counterthesis, the goal of paralogic postpedagogy would not be *understanding* predicated on "Socratic pedagogy" wherein there is a predetermined conclusion to every inquiry ("Three" 166). Vitanza describes this traditional practice as a "philosophical trick and a language game all too damaging to human beings" (166). Vitanza's explanation is telling; he is asking us to question the very values and purposes that have been constants in pedagogy, despite various surface-level changes that have taken place (such as collaborative learning, student-centered classrooms, and rearranging the classroom itself for example). It will thus be the purpose of the rest of this article to discuss how the notion of postpedagogy (what I call w/hole writing and post-critical composition)—moving beyond surface-level reconceptions—might indeed be possible.

This idea is not wholly new. Vitanza cites several people who (in 1991) also provide examples of attempts at postpedagogies ("Three" 170 n. 12). Ulmer is one of those scholars; however, Vitanza does not yet explicate Ulmer's work.[2] Thus, and given that this article began with a timely call for rethinking theory and practice for an electrate apparatus, I hope to show that we can resist the theory/practice split by practicing theories as they emerge. In other words, I am asking readers to consider letting go of the idea that when we teach writing (at any level), we are transmitting a body of knowledge resting on a solid theoretical foundation. Instead, we can encourage students (and ourselves) to participate in inventing new values and purposes for writing in an electrate apparatus. For instance, Ulmer describes the classroom as "a place for invention rather than of reproduction" (*Applied* 163–64). However, he is not saying that we should simply place a stronger focus on the canon of invention in writing courses, as was the case throughout the 1980s and early 1990s in rhetoric and composition (see, for example, Crowley, *Methodical*).

Rather, any pedagogical situation should be considered as a scene for inventions (not predetermined in advance and not necessarily connected logically) to come into appearance. We relinquish the discourse of mastery. We place value on the aspect of chance. By giving up knowing in advance what outcomes will be, we open up a gigantic space for the *potentiality* for writing. Presently, this space holds no value, since educators continue to stifle writing into predetermined forms with predetermined outcomes based on solid theoretical assumptions (all from the apparatus of print).

Theory/Practice: A Heuretical Emergence

> Inventions may be written—generated—without having to be thought first.
>
> —Gregory Ulmer

> The students are helping to invent the future of writing. This attitude and relationship to learning has to be made explicit and encouraged, since students are unaccustomed to working in an experimental way.
>
> —Gregory Ulmer

The methodology of choragraphy (what will have been invented) serves as the best example not only to explain a post-critical composition, but also to show how theory and practice can be seen not as separable entities, but as necessary parts of the w/hole of postpedagogy. Choragraphy does not rely on analysis and synthesis: two concepts tied to print methodologies and fundamental to viewing the world in terms of its elements (see Memmott "Toward Electracy"). I have explicated the origins of choragraphy (traced to Plato's chora) elsewhere (see Arroyo); thus, for the purposes of this article, I will extend my previous explication to include a more in-depth discussion of how choragraphy might take us out of the current conception of theories *turning into* practices.

Ulmer emphasizes that method "becomes invention when it relies on analogy and chance" (*Heuretics* 8); therefore, the method emerges as it is being invented.[3] This concept is crucial. If inventions can be generated or written without having been thought first, then the notion that we turn

theories into practices is not possible. Choragraphy is best described as "a method designed as an alternative to conceptual thinking [that] suggests the possibility of a method that is never practiced the same twice" (*Heuretics* 73, 75). This method emerges holistically, rather than looking at things or problems in terms of their parts. Ulmer claims that many problems exist in a "tangle" but are lost when reduced to parts ("Toward"). To reiterate, choragraphy does not and cannot rely on creating direct and linear applications to pedagogy (that is, learn the theory, analyze it, master it, and apply it by creating concrete exemplifications of it through assignments, and so on). Instead, choragraphy looks to create associative linkages in order to generate something previously unthought-of (that is, experience the theory and create a network of associations).

In order to show how choragraphy works, Ulmer introduced the genre of the "mystory" (currently played out in *Internet Invention*) in the late 1980s. He then used the term "teletheory" to begin articulating the new electrate apparatus. His early incarnation of mystory as teletheory is important, since it specifically explicates Barthes' notion of the *punctum of recognition, the sting* (see *Camera*), Ulmer writes,

> Teletheory [. . .] uses this emotion (nostalgia and melancholy) as a guide to the location of the myths (ideologies) informing the cultural reserve of an individual (using the *punctum* of recognition). [. . .] In *mystory* the *punctum* of emotional recognition is put to work in the service of invention, bringing to bear on disciplinary problems the images and stories of autobiography. . . . The past moments thus rescued are not a spectacle for nostalgic contemplation, *but tools for opening the present* (11; 111; 112; emphasis added).

Mystory looks for senses of the unpresentable, for paralogic linkages, but by way of the accidents that have occurred in several areas of one's own life (not just academic life). The goal is to notice patterns in our lives during life's early stages, instead of after death, which is what commonly happens when our lives are reflected upon or written about. However, creating this network is not merely self-expression. Rather, and as Davis explained at the same CCCC panel discussion referred to earlier, thinking

this way deconstructs the public and private; it puts the personal—the subject's most intimate center—outside and into play, shatters it, and reconstructs it in the public domain. We affirm the accidents, the *punctums* evoked from details of visual scenes; or, as Vitanza puts it, that which "simply falls by the wayside" ("Three" 162). This means that what we work with may not necessarily connect logically or confirm to narrative or any other structure. Instead, we see how things that are typically separated by boundaries set up by private and public institutions are inexplicably linked in important ways. These felt punctums are also what cannot *not* be thought: they exemplify that which keeps repeating in all areas of our lives. These linkages are outside of conceptual, analytical thinking; mystory makes affective connections among the private and public "institutions" of our lives.

Specifically, the four institutions are: Career field (or major); Family; Entertainment; community History (as taught in school or otherwise commemorated in the community) (*Internet* 6). Interlinking these four sites brings about a pattern. The pattern forms "not at the level of meaning or theme. [. . .] Rather, the pattern forms at the level of repeated signifiers—words and graphics," a sampling as such (6). Ulmer explains that "to compose a mystory is to map one's location in a discourse network. A discourse network is not determined in advance, and there are infinite networks" (14). Let this not be confused with the 1980s talk of "discourse communities"; discourse networks are not communities; they are radical singularities: paralogic linkages that arise from experiencing ourselves as images from, as Ulmer puts it, our "pictographic archives."[4] This image archive resides in the body but must be evoked through the network, thereby allowing inventions (not determined in advance) to be "caught" and thus linked. While this example might appear to replicate the very theory/practice split I am interrogating throughout this article, it is important to note that the mystory is not predicated on a theory; rather, it allows students to engage with the theory as it is being practiced. It allows for connections to "give rise."

Alongside this brief introduction of the mystory, we can now move to heuretics (deriving from the combination of hermeneutics + ethics + heretics + heuristics, diuretics, and so on), which is predicated on inventing using choragraphy.[5] This description is important, since heuretics

and choragraphy are designed specifically for the emerging electrate apparatus, and their procedures can generate new works. To locate the relevance of heuretics, Ulmer returns to Peter Ramus, who "oversaw the change in the apparatus (from manuscript to print) that involved institutional practices as much as it did technology. [. . .] The methodological innovation initiated by Ramus culminates in the 5-paragraph theme" (34, 35). Ulmer also attributes to Ramus the immense simplification of the experience of learning: "Once the move was made from manuscript to print, at least two foundational principles of medieval schooling were abandoned: mnemonic training and scholastic logic" (*Internet* 4). This is relevant because, according to Ulmer, we are amidst the same shift today; translating the literate categories that organize knowledge into digital culture shows that the necessary disciplinary separations and specializations (English, History, Sociology, Physics, Architecture, Engineering) are relative to the apparatus of literacy and "have no absolute necessity" in the electrate apparatus (4). The logic of electracy is associative and imagistic; what is important is "the creating of a MOOD or atmosphere. [. . .] Mood is a holistic, emergent kind of order" (Memmott); the space from which the mood emerges can be thought of by means of chora. Ulmer moves specifically to *chora* in *Heuretics* to further describe paralogic linkages (such as those produced by the mystory) that do not logically follow but are made up of a network of associations. Vitanza suggests that what is central to heuretics is the concept of *connectionism*, which serves as:

> [A] new concept of memory. [. . .] Opposed to the classical concept of memory as not storing information in some specific locale from which it may be retrieved, connectionism designs memory as not stored at any specific locus [. . .] but in the myriad relationships among various loci, topoi-cum-chora. ("From" 197)[6]

Connectionism emerges through writing by way of choragraphy and happens when writers/readers *construct patterns* from disassociated parts. Choragraphy reasons with this new concept of memory instead of traditional logic. Ulmer calls this kind of "reasoning" memory a "psychological gesture." The psychological gesture "remembers an emotion: the

body remembers" (213). This new concept of memory is more relevant to the electrate apparatus, since the apparatus itself is emerging in response to the technological ability to capture the sound and motion of the human body. Thus, the "choral world" is another way to describe the electrate apparatus. Ulmer explains:

> So the choral world says, I'm going to write with every meaning of this word, not just one. This is against the univocality of logic of the Western tradition in literacy which claims it can completely disambiguate the word . . . [as if] we can get down to the bottom where there's no confusion.[7]

Again, using all meanings of a word invites ambiguity; ambiguity invites multiple meanings, multiple inventions, and aleatory lines of flight. As an example of this description of the "choral world," we can turn to a key word Ulmer uses as a metaphor for choral writing: "felt." Different from a woven textile, a "text" invented by way of choragraphy is not a text but a "felt": felt, in this case, carries multiple meanings. One corresponds to the emotional qualities arising from punctums of recognition. The second is "felt" as material. Ulmer writes, "We have forgotten that 'text'—the common name for written compositions—derives from 'textile' [woven fabric]." He thus links to "felt," which "replaces 'textile' as a fabric craft to be developed as a vehicle for the tenor of imaged compositions" (*Internet* 35). Felt is rolled, mashed, and difficult to break into pieces. To further this discussion, Deleuze and Guattari describe felt (as different from woven fabric) as follows:

> Felt is a supple solid product that proceeds altogether differently, as an anti-fabric. It implies no separation of threads, no intertwining, only an entanglement of fibers obtained by fulling (for example, by rolling the block of fibers back and forth). What becomes entangled are the microscales of the fibers. An aggregate of intrication of this kind is in no way homogeneous: it is nevertheless smooth, and contrasts point by point with the space of fabric. (*Thousand* 475)

From this description of felt, Ulmer moves to an explanation on how to make felt, which then serves as the metaphor for choral writing. These linkages are in no way logical (from writing to making felt), yet they still

generate and invent a new method based on multiple meanings of the words in question. These linkages also cannot be summarily codified and transmitted; the paralogy involved here does not make communication easier. Instead, it opens up even more possibilities and linkages, and it creates metaphors for how we might begin to envision writing in an electrate apparatus. Choragraphy presupposes no control over one's own presuppositions; nor does it presuppose a "communicative interaction," in which triangulation among self and other occurs. Ulmer also reminds us that in order to intervene in the "choral world," we should be "attuned to coincidence," to the things in our lives that we usually disregard as accidental and illogical (226).

Thus, in order to see beyond the print apparatus and into the choral world, we would not apply hermeneutics to a theory and then wait for it to mature before realizing application possibilities. Rather, recall that for heuretics, information is evoked rather than found; hence, these evocations (also previously described as connectionism)—"distributed" memories—"function by means of pattern making, pattern recognition, pattern generation" (*Heuretics* 36). Patterns and networks become crucial for using theory to invent new practices, since it is the recognition of a pattern as it is occurring that drives the new invention. Circling back to the distinction between Vitanza's and Kent's conceptualization of paralogy, we can how see how heuretics functions as a postpedagogy. Ulmer further describes heuretics as follows:

> As a pedagogy, heuretics encounters inventors before they have discovered anything. Hermeneutic teaching does a good job of covering all the solutions to problems found so far. Heuretic teaching complements hermeneutic pedagogy by approaching invention from the side of not knowing. ("Untied" 578)

Instead of creating "masters" of heuretics, heuretic pedagogy would create consultants working alongside one another to forge connections. The connections the consultants experience bring the materials of a problem into "sudden, unexpected relationship with other areas of a thinker's experience" (*Heuretics* 142). This is the experience of a "felt": blending (but not into homogenous material) all areas of experience to

make and thus write new discoveries. This is thinking through the body, taking into consideration the feelings a particular environment evokes and linking them accordingly.

Heuretics offers an alternative to pedagogy hope and the pedagogical imperative in composition. Davis suggests, "The pedagogical imperative has been responsible for perpetuating a subtle reign of terror in universities and schoolhouses," a reign of terror based on exclusion and deflection of "felt" knowledge not "appropriate" for academic knowledge (*Breaking* 213). Postpedagogy, realized through choragraphy and heuretics, allows for felt knowledge to be realized and linked, which is another way to describe how theory and practice work in an electrate apparatus.

The Sample: Post-Critical Composition *Live*

> Underlying Composition is not so much Real-World Writing as Real-Wayne's World Writing: everything is underscored with the parodic *Not!*
>
> —Geoffrey Sirc

Sirc's "Real-Wayne's World Writing" evokes Giorgio Agamben's description of subjectivity: the "whatever" being. The "not" of the whatever does not just indicate the opposite (negatively deconstruct) of what has been put forward; rather, the "not" indicates a positive potential—what has yet to be invented (not a "no")—and a network of *potentialities* similar to what I have been arguing for. "Not!" moves the whatever out of compliance and onto the threshold of meaning. Agamben explains, "If every power is equally the power to be and the power to not-be, the passage to action can only come about by transporting (Aristotle says 'saving') in the act its own power to not-be" (*The Coming Community* 36). Thus, every thought is always accompanied by "not," and, if considered in a parodic Wayne's World fashion, this "not" is not a refusal to act but an invitation to act otherwise. Interestingly, Ulmer relates the concept of the parodic "not" to one of the most mass forms of entertainment on television: the soap opera. He makes this linkage by describing the reasoning involved in soap operas, coming across through "discontinuities, substitutions, and duplications [that] shatter the illusion which once

would have been called bourgeois verisimilitude" (*Heuretics* 128; qtd. in Crary 289). In other words, when the illusion of a linear narrative is created, it is interrupted with "Not!" and identification melts away. I want students to pay attention to the "nots" in their own writing; these "k/nots" present them and us with places where invention can and should occur. These "k/nots" also disrupt clichéd responses and do not allow for writing to be stifled into predetermined forms. "Not!" for composition also offers an explanation of theory's resistance to creating neat, linear practices. The following examples highlight how choragraphy and heuretics have made their way into classrooms and popular culture. These instances serve as exemplars for seeing theory and practice in an electrate way. They should not be viewed as concrete prescriptions for how others can contribute to the task of inventing a rhetoric for electracy; rather, and as I explain in the final words of this article, they might serve as texts (felts) that will resonate and thus forge new linkages.

Jeff Rice, in "The 1963 Hip-Hop Machine: Hip-Hop Pedagogy As Composition," provides an example of the "Not!" for composition. Rice's methodology relies on choragraphy but is demonstrated through hip-hop culture's practice of sampling. Sampling is a process of "saving snippets of prerecorded music and sound into a computer memory" these snippets are then pasted into a new composition (454). Rice's article demonstrates what writing for an electrate apparatus might look like. In electracy, and as Rice shows, connections are more important than proofs: creating a network is more important than explaining things in depth and with critical distance. Writers pay attention to what affective memory calls up and link those things accordingly in order to begin practicing writing in a manner better suited for electracy.

Rice begins by relating his version of "whatever" to Barthes' *punctum*. Although Rice does not mention electracy directly, Ulmer has importantly connected the whatever to electracy. Ulmer writes:

> In [*The Coming Community*] Agamben theorizes the specific nature of the photographic image and its manner of signification. [. . .] Part of his problem is that he is using conceptual literate method and discourse to inquire into the nature of that which is native to the pictorial, which falls outside the realm of concepts and conceptualization (the cognitive mode

> of literacy). Two features of Agamben's solution to this difficulty are relevant to our discussion of electracy. ("Toward")

For the purposes of this article, the most relevant feature is Agamben's whatever. Ulmer says that in the context of electracy, what "meaning" is to words, "whatever" is to photographs. Recall that choragraphy works from the punctum of recognition that "stings" us into awareness; through Barthes, we see that the punctum is also a version of a "hole," a piercing of sorts. For Rice, and by way of a slightly different way of seeing the punctum, "Barthes' punctum transforms into whatever" (456). Herein lies another explanation reminding us that when working with images, we cannot simply transfer print-based practices. When working with images, we must pay attention to the affective responses rising to the forefront and how these responses might be linked (not analyzed). Rice further explains the transformation (from punctum to whatever) as follows:

> For Barthes, the whatever offers more than just an indefinable reaction. Barthes's punctum (or whatever) initiates an attempt to develop an alternative critical practice. The whatever challenges conventional reading practices by cutting a detail from its original source and recontextualizing it within a different setting. Barthes's purpose is to use the detail as a way to critique cultural practices. (456)

Rice sees the punctum as an elusive "unnamed detail" that might evoke a bodily reaction but then elicit the verbal response, "whatever," because of the inability to articulate the feeling in words. Perhaps Rice avoids discussing this unnamed detail as the sting to evade the accusation of simply returning to expressive discourse. However, I would add the necessary "emotional" connotation to his description, since the detail, the punctum, is first *felt* and then (re)composed as felt. Rice's description of the punctum as whatever then moves him to consider Ulmer (critique as "sample") and Sirc (inventing from the "temporal moment") to construct writing and cultural critique from these series of unrelated details (also see Sirc, "Never" 10). Rice suggests that hip-hop "teaches that cultural research and awareness produce composite forms of writing" (455); as a postpedagogy, hip-hop pedagogy emerges from a series of samples. In Rice's case, these moments come from 1963.

Rice juxtaposes five cultural moments from 1963: Gordon Parks' photograph of Malcom X; Leonard Freed's photograph *New York City*; the artist Romare Bearden's Prevalence of Ritual Series; Blue Note Records, a prolific jazz producer [specifically Freddie Roach's *Mo Greens Please*]; and James Brown's *Live at the Apollo Vol. 1*. He engages with choragraphy by first describing particular details from these moments and then "mixing" them into a "pedagogical digital sampler," like the recording device that saves digital information in computer memory. The mix also includes William Burroughs—writing in the time period surrounding 1963—who argued for "a confrontation with so-called 'reality,' the dominant ideology propagated in media formations and often taken for granted as natural" (466). Rice links Burroughs to his use of hip-hop pedagogy that similarly argues that the " 'reality' of academic writing (the linear structure of thesis, support, conclusion) is in fact an ideological formation that can and should be challenged through the sample" (466–67). But instead of providing the theory first, Rice invents the sample to demonstrate his challenge.

Part of the "mix" created by these samples includes the space where this "composition" takes place. The space for the 1963 sample is Allen Kaprow's 1962 Happening *Words*, "originally performed at the Simolin Gallery in New York" (467). This Happening included words: quotations taken from a variety of sources hanging from the ceiling and the walls. Viewers were "encouraged to either add to the hanging and posted collections or rearrange the display. In the background, turntables played recordings of Kaprow's voice" (467). The viewer (listener, writer) is an active part of the scene, "cutting" and "pasting" the display, thereby relinquishing its status as a sort of sacred monument in a museum. Rice further links this mix to hip-hop by citing the expression *"word"* as the "be-all answer to whatever-type questions, a way to deal with allusive meanings" (467). "Word" can also be thought of as the "Not!" of hip-hop: not saying "no," but also not offering a definite answer. "Word" is a way to keep the conversation going and to open up a network of possibilities. It is the "word" to say when we experience that which cannot be articulated in words.

It is not difficult to find numerous examples of sampling in popular culture, particularly in the musical world. I believe these musical ex-

amples are extremely pertinent to those of us who claim writing as our object of scholarly study, since all things involved—from composing to producing to selling lyrics—demonstrate what matters in the electrate apparatus, which can be directly connected to writing (composition) as well. In "Sample the Future," Thomas Goetz explains the unprecedented release of a free CD—given away in the November 2004 issue of *Wired* Magazine—created specifically for the use of sampling. He writes, "By contributing a track to *The Wired CD*, these musicians acknowledge that for an art form to thrive, it needs to be open, fluid, and alive" (183). I connect this assertion directly to writing and electracy. The musicians recorded their tracks under a new Creative Commons copyright license that allows listeners to become active participants in the listening experience by cutting, pasting, and sampling from the tracks. Goetz describes this new copyright license as "simply codifying what modern culture has already decided it wants to be: a hybrid nation of explicit influences, generous borrowings, and inside references. It's a remix culture, a layer-upon-layer construction [. . .]" (183). Goetz's "remix culture" aptly describes how theories and practices are shattered and reconstructed in an electrate apparatus (an example of a w/hole). However, affirming the remix culture for writing requires us to set aside print-only values (such as linear thinking and providing one definition for things). If we relinquish our commitment to constant stability and definition, then we remain open to the multiple possibilities writing offers in electracy. If we strengthen our commitment to multiple meanings, then more creative and imaginative writing will emerge. If we follow the lead of the music industry, then we will have to invent new "rules" for writing and make them at least partially legitimate.[8]

Yet another way to think about sampling is to link it to the production style of not only hip-hop music but also "reality" television shows, particularly on MTV, which is famous for its rapid montage-style production. The so-called "MTV generation" understands and responds to this type of production more so than to traditional, linear narratives. "The Real World"—still vaguely promoted under the guise of "a day in the life"—ultimately comes to viewers in a series of montages or samples constructed through cutting and pasting: a "sampling" of video footage, sounds, songs, and even text to create what appears to be a whole

happening. As the seasons have progressed, the shows have made a remarkable turn away from linearity and toward an extremely heavy reliance on sampling and juxtaposition. We see several "samples" cut from the narrative in which they "really" happened and juxtaposed in a way that creates a network of several possibilities and meanings. Because time and space are suspended, the montage that viewers see specifically targets emotional responses in order to create a network of associations. Thus, in a writing class and instead of writing a linear-driven, well-worked-out critique exposing the illusion of the "reality" depicted in the programs (as advocated by popular composition textbooks such as *In Context*), and following Rice's suggestions, students would engage in their own depiction of such "reality." The goal is not just to expose the production techniques of these shows in order to critique them and make viewers aware of the false pretenses under which they operate; rather, it is to engage, heuretically, with those very techniques. In other words, in this example, values for writing change. It is less important to make students analyze how the illusion of a linear narrative might be duping them into thinking that what is happening is "reality," and more important to show them how to respond to the show by creating remixes (w/holes) of their own. These shows also have companion websites, blogs, chat rooms, and countless extensions that expand how students interact with them. Writing then comes to life, is open and alive, is "felt," and is set into motion by each writer's network of linkages.

Writing/Teaching; Theory/Practice

I have attempted to present w/hole writing as an example of postpedagogy: of a theory that is practiced as it is being put forth. Perhaps Cynthia Haynes' haunting yet elusive remark: *"We must enter in the space of amnesia, of phantom pain,"* can now be seen in a new light. The "space of amnesia" might be the postpedagogical classroom, where past, print-only practices are temporarily forgotten, and the ensuing "phantom pain" is where these practices once existed. But, in this scenario, we would not mourn for these practices, and the pain is not equated with fear or terror. Rather, it is "live," always present in its absence, "stinging" or moving us into action. Readers may ask how I have specifically practiced what I have

been advocating, and may even expect such a description in this final section. However, if I describe a course I have taught and the particular work students produced, I would be implicitly relying on the very assumptions I have critiqued throughout this piece. Instead, I will conclude with how we might reenvision pedagogy by reenvisioning ourselves. Under this description, as writing teachers, we can think of ourselves as "energies" or "forces": "feelings" (or whatever) that come across intuitively to students and open up a space for them to engage with writing. Similar to a punctum (taking place at this primal level) and as I have been discussing throughout this article, this is difficult to codify and communicate to others who ask "what/how do you teach?" So, I turn to yet another version of postpedagogy put forth by Paul Kameen in, *Writing/Teaching: Essays Toward A Rhetoric of Pedagogy*. Kameen sees *writing* and *teaching* as always symbiotic in their relationship and suggests that what and how we teach comes from certain "texts" that repeat for us (this might be thought of, loosely, as our "theories"). These texts carry "felts" for us; we respond to them because we feel a connection with them beyond trying to "turn" them into lessons for the classroom. Rather, "after enough re-readings, you start to carry those voices into the classroom with you—not so much as in conscious thinking but more in the mode of productive, inaudible bickering over what exactly to do, and why, and how, and when" (144). Kameen explains, however, that just because he has these "texts" that help make him the teacher he is, he definitely does not emulate or even vaguely resemble any of them. Instead, these "texts" come out as "samples," "remixes" for particular students at particular times and are necessarily remixed each time a new group of students arrives. This requires writing teachers, as intensities, to tap into their own as well as their students' "texts" (as felts). These felts work as part of a singular collage that fosters what happens in the classroom throughout the course of the semester or quarter. Then the collage loosens and is reassembled into different combinations for the next pedagogical scene.

Kameen's attitude toward teaching can also be explained through Barthes, who calls writing a "tissue of quotations" (see *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*); this "tissue," as it relates to teaching comes from embedded bodily responses, responses that guide what we do when we

write and teach. It is important to keep in mind, then, that one can intervene in inventing the electrate apparatus without using the texts and theorists I've cited in this essay. Intervening requires putting together a collage of our own (and students') texts and assignments (which very well may include some of the texts I've explicated). This largely has to do with adjusting our own attitudes about teaching writing and our relationships with language, not necessarily just enacting different practices in our classrooms. Thus, as a postpedagogy, w/hole writing and post-critical composition *must be reinvented* by each theorist/practitioner, one who engages with not a predetermined set of theories or texts but from what Sirc alludes to as "composition-at-large" (*English* 263). Composition-at-large includes all of the discourses of our lives, not just the disciplinary ones (recall the mystory). Hopefully, in the emerging electrate apparatus, we will stop thinking of theory and practice as necessarily separate and instead see them as working side by side to evoke those inventions that have yet to be thought.

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Notes

1. Lynn Worsham calls pedagogy hope the "will to pedagogy" and explains that the pedagogical imperative is "at the heart of a discipline requiring every theory of writing to translate into a pedagogical practice or at least some specific advice for teachers" (96).

2. Vitanza cites Ulmer's "post(e)pedagogy" as explicated in *Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys* and "Textshop for Post(e)pedagogy" as an example of avoiding pedagogy hope, but he does not go further. Since the publication of "Three Countertheses," however, Vitanza has fully accepted Ulmer's grammatological writing and postpedagogy. This acceptance is exemplified by his numerous references to it in his later work and especially by publishing Ulmer's new textbook, *Internet Invention*, in his series.

3. Ulmer links "method" with the practice of method acting, which is another metaphor for interface ("to gain access to the unfamiliar by means of the familiar" (*Heuretics* 115). He explains method acting as follows: "The value of Method as

analogy for choragraphy concerns the way it requires the actors to merge their personal culture with that of the play, whose themes and scenes are translated in rehearsal, using the technique of Affective memory, into the actor's own experiences, cultural backgrounds, and memories. During rehearsal a series of improvisational exercises, often far removed from the words of the script, remake the play in terms of the actors' autobiographies, finding equivalents and analogies in their life stories for the Idea, Objectives, and Actions that emerged from the table work" (116). These "improvisational exercises" are not part of the final "product" of the play, but are key in making it work. Ulmer would be more interested in the content of those exercises than in the product itself. Ulmer stresses that the key to method acting is the psychological gesture: "The actors found the gestural trigger of the emotion (anger, love, envy, hate) by reconstructing the physical setting of a memory" (117–118). The details of the physical setting, the punctums present in the image, provide linkages to the script, which help get the actor "in character."

Additionally, relating this concept to the emerging apparatus of electracy, Ulmer stresses, "We are inventing electracy. Electracy does not already exist as such, but names an apparatus that is emerging 'as we speak,' rising in many different spheres and areas, and converging in some unforeseeable yet malleable way" (*Internet Invention* 7). Echoing this statement, Ulmer, in his aforementioned CCCC talk, emphatically stated: "Electracy is happening." Because electracy is already happening, the possibility of ignoring it is becoming more and more impossible, so the exigency to come up with theories and methods designed for electracy resonates strongly.

4. Thomas Rickert provides an explanation of this type of network in his response essay "Enjoying Theory." He equates it with "theory" and writes: "It is important to note that 'theory' is not an object so much as a contentious discursive network, always seeking, adapting, questioning, postulation, and creating. This means that it is wildly recursive. [. . .] Whatever our relation to theory, it is not something we can simply escape or abandon through praxis. Nor is it, finally, something to be controlled or corralled, precisely because its recursiveness will exceed all bo(u)nds" (636 n. 5). This explanation links to how theory is conceptualized post-critically; in other words, theory is not an object to be "used," but is instead a force and intensity.

5. Micheal Jarratt provides some historical information on the word *heuretics* at http://www.yk.psu.edu/~jmj3/defheu.htm. He explains, "While readers might

associate *heuretics* with a varied set of connotators—eureka, heuristics, heretics, and, yes, diuretics—the word originated as a theological term, as the flip-side or repressed Other of hermeneutics. One could interpret scripture (read through a hermeneutic), or one could employ scripture as a means of invention (read it heuretically). Hermeneutics asks, What can be *made of* the Bible? Heuretics asks, What can be *made from* the Bible? Hermeneutics was secularized early on. It provided methodologies of reading, legitimated the study of texts and, in effect, created the Renaissance humanist. Heuretics enjoyed neither prestige nor currency, and though I suspect the word popped up now and again during witch trials (in the mouths of prosecutors), its systematic use has been largely confined to the fine arts." Jarratt also suggests that Ulmer's *Teletheory* is the first to use heuretics in critical discourse, and, as I have also suggested, Ulmer develops it in *Heuretics*.

6. Vitanza's article "From Heuristic to Aleatory Procedures" is a very succinct exposition of heuretics and especially Ulmer's CATTt heuristic, which he describes as "the stand-in" for the impossibility of the chora (196). I will not address the CATTt heuristic here, since I do not think it corresponds with what I have been advocating as a post-critical composition. As Vitanza has suggested, the CATTt (Contrast, Analogy, Theory, Target, tale) serves as a stand-in to describe chora, which resists and evades description. I have found that choragraphy does indeed explain how a post-critical composition works without having to resort to the specifics of the CATTt, which might be confused as a "heuristic" designed for the literate apparatus.

7. This discussion can be located at http://www.cas.usf.edu/journal/ulmer/ulmer.html

8. I hasten to mention this, because I have been arguing that prescriptions for pedagogy in an electracy apparatus are counter-productive, but I will say that I use the *Wired* CD as a text in my writing classes. I encourage students to sample from it and create remixes and add the sample to their electrate compositions. Part of their experience in the class involves inventing new ways and finding new mediums in which to create these compositions, and every semester, we, then, have contributed to the task of inventing a rhetoric for electracy.

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