Ethos, Pathos and Logos in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Re-Examination *

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ABSTRACT: In Aristotle's *Rhetoric, logos* must be conceived as enthymematical argumentation relative to the issue of the case. *Ethos* and *pathos* also can take the form of an enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn't relate (directly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the *ethos* of the speaker or (reasons for) the *pathos* of the audience. In an ideal situation – with a good procedure and rational judges – *logos* dominates and in the real situation of Aristotle's time – with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges – *ethos* and *pathos* prevail.

KEY WORDS: Rhetoric, Aristotle's enthymeme, *ethos-pathos-logos*-distinction, ideal speech situation

1. INTRODUCTION

In one of their publications about fallacies, which they conceive as violations of the rules for rational discussions, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst[1] formulate the following discussion rule (with elucidation):

> A standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.

> For a dispute to be resolved it is required that in defending his standpoint the protagonist use argumentation only, and that his argumentation genuinely relate to the disputed standpoint. This rule is broken if a standpoint is defended by argumentation not relating to the original standpoint, or by means other than argumentation. In the first case we are dealing with irrelevant argumentation, in the second with non-argumentation. With the use of non-argumentation, achieving approbation of an audience is aimed at in an improper manner, which is why this surrogate argumentation is a spurious means of discussion. The rhetorical ruses used instead of proper argumentation exploit either the emotions or prejudices of the audience, or the protagonist's personal peculiarities, his expertise or other qualities. In the former case *pathos* takes the place of *logos*, in the latter *ethos*.

First, from this quotation it appears that the classic trio *ethos-pathos-logos* is still topical in the study of argumentation. Secondly, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose that *ethos* and *pathos* are objectionable means of persuasion which

are not truly argumentative. In this perception they are not alone, although other modern theorists assert that *ethos* and *pathos* are respectable and argumentative methods.

The group of theorists who advance the argumentative nature of *ethos* and *pathos* includes Ehninger and Brockriede. In *Decision by Debate* these scholars use the classic trio in order to classify warrants from Toulmin's argumentation model. Next to 'logical' warrants as causality and analogy, they differentiate 'ethical' and 'pathetic' warrants, which derive their force respectively from 'the credibility of an arguer or a source' and from 'compatibility with the beliefs, attitudes, and values of judges'.[2] Two examples follow (see Figure 1):[3]


Figure 1

In addition, Ehninger and Brockriede claim that, in practice, we mostly discern a mixture: most arguments derive their power of persuasion from a fusion of *ethos, pathos* and *logos*.[4]

With such a difference of opinion and appreciation concerning fundamental ideas in a profession, it is worthwhile to go into the history of the relative concepts. This article is limited to the beginning of that history following the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. Later changes of meaning, touted by Cicero, Quintilian and others, are not considered.

It is well known that Aristotle deals comprehensively in book 1 and 2 of the *Rhetoric* with the material means of persuasion, and deals, more briefly, in book 3, with style and arrangement. He divides the material means in 1.2.2 into non-technical and technical ones by employing a simple criterion: can the mean be found with (or without) the rhetorical *techne* or method? The technical means are then subdivided into *ethos, pathos* and *logos* in 1.2.3. This discussion fills the rest of book 1 and 2, although Aristotle incidentally returns to each of these elements in book 3.

What meaning did Aristotle truly ascribe to his three parts of technical means? If we study not only the *Rhetoric* itself but also the philological literature, we discover that both the trio and its contradictory, modern interpretations have classical beginnings. Classical scholars interpret this most crucial point in two ways. Most of them, adherents of the 'traditional exegesis',[5] agree with the opinion of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst: In the *Rhetoric*, *ethos* and *pathos* are non-argumentative and inferior forms of persuasion; only *logos* is enthymematical or argumentative.[6] In contrast, Grimaldi[7] asserts that the *Rhetoric* must be read in such a way that *ethos, pathos* and *logos* can all take the enthymematical form, and that an enthymeme ideally unites these three elements. Compare the attitude of Ehninger and Brockriede.

I will try to define my position in this philological controversy by answering the following questions on the text[8] of the *Rhetoric*:
- How do we interpret each of the three means? Is it possible to put each single mean into an enthymematical form? Conversely, is it possible to fuse the three means into one enthymeme?
- What valuation is given to *ethos* and *pathos*?

2. THE ENTHYMEMATICAL STATUS OF *ETHOS, PATHOS* AND *LOGOS*

Before discussing the possibly enthymematical character of *ethos* and *pathos*, let us consider the enthymematical nature of *logos*.

Logos. First, I propose, due to the following examples, that *logos* probably has no sole right to the enthymeme, although, contrary to *ethos* and *pathos*, it is usually associated with the enthymeme.[9]
- In 1.2.3 the "logical proof"[10] is introduced as the mean that exists "in the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove" (*en autoi toi logoi, dia*

tou deiknunai e phainesthai deiknunai).[11] The distinction between the real and the would-be proof apparently points to the later distinction between correct and incorrect enthymemes (on which the partitioning of 2.23 and 2.24 is based).

— In 1.2.7, Aristotle insists that using the explained "logical proof" demands the competent use of syllogisms (using "syllogism" here in the widest sense, including the enthymeme, which is called a rhetorical variation of the syllogism in 1.1.11).

— In 1.2.8[12] he says that, for the "logical proof", the speaker can choose two forms of argumentation: the enthymeme and the paradigm (the latter is in fact a subtype of the enthymeme[13]).

— In 1.8.6, 2.1.2, 2.1.5, and 3.1.1, "logical proof" is explained in terms of (derivatives of) *apodeixis* (proof[14]), while in 1.1.11 the enthymeme is called the rhetorical form of *apodeixis*. In 1.2.20, both enthymeme and paradigm are called *pisteis apodeiktikai* while in 3.17, we come back to the enthymeme and paradigm *à la* 1.2, at the so-called, apodictical part of the speech *pistis (argumentatio)*.

Because of these examples, it seems safe to assume that the logical proof constantly takes the *form* of enthymematical argumentation. More importantly, however, what *matter* and *function* are given to the "logical enthymeme" in the *Rhetoric*? What does it prove? What is it for?

The principle that appears to be at the heart of the *ethos-pathos-logos* trio in 1.2.3 gives us a first hint. Because Aristotle constantly uses the communication triangle speaker-audience-subject,[15] and the trio in any example of *ethos* (speaker) and *pathos* (audience), we are almost bound to think that the logical proof which is given in 1.2.6 ("the establishing of the true or apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable to each individual subject"[16]) supports this conclusion, as does the replacement by Aristotle of *pragma* with *logos* in the trio.[17]

A second and clearer indication is seen in 1.3–1.14 and 3.17. In 1.3, Aristotle first outlines the three kinds of speech. Each kind has a specific end, meaning that in each type of speech, a certain kind of thesis is the central point. The political orator must argue that the subject under discussion is either expedient or harmful, the legal adviser that the conduct to be judged is just or unjust and the epideictical speaker that the person under discussion is either honourable or dishonourable (1.3.5). Next, Aristotle combines this type of dominant thesis with enthymeme theory, explained in the previous chapter. In 1.3.7, he says that the speaker has to have the premises (*protaseis*) in relation to these theses at his disposal. With these premises, the orator can form enthymemes in order to strengthen his thesis. These premises, categorized by type of speech, fill 1.4, up to and including 1.14, and resurface yet again in 2.1.1 and 2.22.16.[18]

In 3.17, the chapter about the *argumentatio*, the logical enthymeme is also directed to the central thesis of the speech, however, the systematics do not concern the *tele* (ends). Aristotle now says that the *apodeixis*, meaning the enthymematical argumentation, must point to the *amphisbetesis* or the disputed

issue. This issue, in later rhetoric called *stasis (status)*, determines the central thesis. For example, in a criminal case, if the question in dispute concerns the question of fact, then the central thesis is about the committing of the act (3.17.1).

Therefore, we can conclude that *logos* takes the form of an enthymeme, directed to the central thesis of the speech (or, of course, a subthesis of the speech). This reasoning seems to support the traditional viewpoint, but it does not preclude *ethos* and *pathos* also taking the form of an enthymeme.

Ethos. The "ethical proof" is formed by *ethos* (character or personality) of the speaker (*ethos tou legontos*, 1.2.3, not to be confused with other manifestations of *ethos*[19]). The successful "ethical proof" requires that the speech be given in such a way that the speaker sounds credible. However, Aristotle insists that the credibility must come from the delivery of the speech and not from the audience's preconceived ideas about the speaker (1.2.4).[20] True credibility results when the audience attributes three qualities to the speaker because of what is said; these virtues are good sense, virtue and goodwill (*phronesis, arete* and *eunoia*, 2.1.5 and 1.8.6).

But how can these three components of *ethos* manifest themselves in the speech? Can this be done in the framework of an enthymeme? And if so, can *ethos* and *logos* co-occur in one enthymeme?

As introduction I would like to indicate two ways *ethos* components can appear in a speech: First, via *indices* from which the *audience* concludes that the speaker possesses a certain amount and type of *ethos*; and secondly, via *arguments* from which the *speaker* concludes that a certain amount and type of *ethos* has to be awarded to him. In the first case *ethos* is shown, in the second it is proven. First, I will try to discover if Aristotle has thought of this second form of *ethos*, which is by definition enthymematic. In any case, it seems so.

First, he refers in 2.1.7 to his analysis of the virtues in 1.9, thereby showing how to give the impression that the speaker has good sense and virtue. Aristotle thus claims that the means of representing the discussed person in a certain way (as good or bad) lend themselves equally to the speaker's presentation of himself. For goodwill, the third component of *ethos*, he first points to the treatment of the emotions, mostly to *philia* or friendship in 2.4 (2.1.8).[21]

It is possible to view these references so that Aristotle also thought of the enthymematical proof of "ethical" qualities, for in 1.9 *protaseis* or premises are presented in order to form epideictical enthymemes, through which the speaker can argue that the discussed person is praiseworthy or blameworthy. Should the speaker refer to himself in these arguments, he can imply that he possesses *phronesis* or *arete*. And at the end of 2.4, Aristotle says that, by means of the discussed principles, it is possible to prove (*apodeiknunai*) or to refute (*dialuein*) that people are friends or foes, notwithstanding their actual status. For the speaker, this implies that his goodwill toward the audience can be argued according to the guidelines of 2.4 (for instance, by showing that he is a friend of the friends of the public, 2.4.6).

Secondly, we can, although Aristotle himself does not say so, find implicit
signs of the proof of *ethos* in 3.15 and 3.19, where the evoking and the removal
of a prejudice (*diabole*) (which the audience holds against the speaker) and the
praising of oneself and the blaming of the opposition are successively presented.
It is true that these passages deal with sophistic, pre-Aristotelian[22] forms of
ethos in the *exordium* and the *peroratio* respectively (parts of the speech with
which Aristotle does not connect his enthymeme theory), but there is also
certain discussion of the proof of *ethos*, and therefore of *ethos*, that evolves in an
Aristotelian way through the speech. This is clearest in 3.15 which, like other
chapters, contains argumentation guidelines *à la* the later doctrine of *stasis* in
order to deny or to mitigate a prejudice (for instance, a prejudice about reprehen-
sible sexual behaviour, 3.15.5). The same guidelines about how to defend
oneself against the central accusation are given in 3.18; it is here that the
enthymeme theory is mentioned.[23] In 3.19, he once again refers to the epideicti-
cal *protaseis* to present oneself as praiseworthy and the opposition as blamewor-
thy – the latter implies that the accuser conjures up prejudices against the
defendant (3.14.7).

The previously mentioned references suggest that Aristotle himself recog-
nized the possibility that one could argue *ethos* enthymematically. In any case,
this type of enthymeme can be reconstructed on the basis of the *Rhetoric*. In this
kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the *ethos* of the speaker;
therefore, in this case, *ethos* and *logos* cannot be combined because with *logos*
the conclusion is relative to the issue. Naturally, the proved *ethos* does assist the
persuasion of the logical proof with the assistance of the logical enthymeme:
after the *ethos* has been proved or restored, the audience will more easily accept
the proof relative to the issue.

More important than the proved *ethos*, which quickly becomes counter-
productive and chiefly takes a marginal place in introduction and finish, is the
indexical *ethos*. After all, one can better suggest *ethos* than prove it because
attempting to prove *ethos* would produce doubt about the *ethos*! Only when one
is certain that the *ethos* has been undermined by prejudices, can proving the
ethos make sense.

The suggestive *ethos* rests on a principle which Aristotle presents in a
different context, in 3.7.4 and 6. Due to indices, or *semeia*, the audience reasons
that something which belongs to the indices, in this case *ethos*, is present.
According to Aristotle, the public here uses a (sham) syllogism: I perceive index
x; if I perceive index x, then I can come to the conclusion y (*ethos*); therefore y
is present.[24] These indices which "show" *ethos* can assume all kinds of rhetori-
cal forms. In terms of the *officia oratoris*, the discovery of certain ideas as well
as the arrangement, style and delivery can all send "signals" to persuade the
audience to award the speaker (a high or low) *ethos*.[25] Here I will deal only with
the first category of indexical *ethos*. Although one can obviously also give
enthymemes an "ethical" color by adequate arrangement, style and delivery,
only the "ethical" ideas can function as premises.[26]

The first passage which seems relevant in this context is 1.8.6 in the chapter

about forms of government. Here, Aristotle says that the political orator must tune his *ethos*, manifested in his ethical preference (*proairesis*) to the *ethos* of the form of government preferred by his audience: democracy, aristocracy, etc. When the preferences of orator and audience go hand in hand, then the audience will show trust because the speaker appears good (*agathos*) and benevolent (*eunous*).[27]

Alternate advice about aligning one's own *ethos* to that of the listener is found in 2.13.16. Because the audience enjoys listening to speeches which mirror its own nature, the speaker would do well to adapt himself and what he says to the *ethe* or characters of the audience. In one: one must give consideration to the age and well-being of the audience. The thought behind this, although it is not mentioned in so many words, is once again that an audience which sees itself reflected in the speaker will give *ethos* and thus trust.[28]

Aristotle touches on a third variation in 2.21, the chapter about *gnomai* (maxims). Generally speaking, the use of *gnomai* can "ethically" color the speech, but it is more definitely recommended that a private experience of the people be generalized in *gnomai*. Therefore, with a certain kind of audience, one would be liked if one said: nothing is more stupid than to beget children (2.21.15).

These are the relevant places from book 1 and 2 which treat the *inventio*. I have by-passed widespread remarks about *ethos*-indices in book 3, such as word choices which suit the *ethos* of the speaker and the casual reference in the *narratio* to one's behavior and statements through which *ethos* shows.[29] Instead, I would like to turn to the question of how the aforementioned forms of indexical *ethos* compare to the enthymeme. Can one build enthymemes with such indices, and if possible, what kinds of enthymemes? Aristotle himself does not mention this issue, except with the *gnomai*,[30] but this absence is characteristic of his obscure treatment of the ethical and pathetic proof.

I think it is quite possible, even inevitable, to form certain logical enthymemes with premises that indicate the speaker's *ethos*, particularly logical enthymemes with normative conclusions, as evidenced in political and epideictical speeches and in judicial arguments which resolve around *status qualitatis*.[31] For example: Gentlemen, you will see how useful my suggestion is, because it is necessary in order to defend our democratic freedom. Through the audience-centered choice of this premise, the speaker first shows that he is aware of the interests of his audience so that he receives *ethos*. And secondly, the speaker fosters the acceptance of his argument by the audience: after all, it is sure to accept the implied warrant: "A policy is useful when it is necessary in order to defend our democratic freedom." From this example, we also see that *ethos* does not itself serve as a premise; the speaker supplies an explicit premise from which the audience concludes that the speaker possesses *ethos*. This premise leads via a warrant, that puts the shared values of speaker and audience into words, to the conclusion of the dispute.[32]

Hence, we arrive at a conclusion which Aristotle himself does not outline explicitly, and in fact, seems to contradict. In 3.17.8 he warns: "Nor should you

look for an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give the speech an ethical character." In other words, in the eyes of Aristotle, *ethos* and enthymeme seem to exclude one another.[33] Although one does not usually warn against anything that is impossible, Aristotle's remark is important. This warning could be interpreted in the following way. Ethical passages usually get their character from the *proairesis*, moral preference, of the speaker who expresses it. However, (logical) enthymemes appear in apodeictical passages which, ideally, are objective (like mathematical truths). Here, we can recall the proof of a fact in criminal cases or discussions about the factual effect of proposed policies. Indeed, Aristotle especially thought of those kinds of factual argumentation in relation to the enthymematical proof, as shown in 1.1.6 and 8 and 3.1.5. (I come back to this at the end of my observation about *pathos*.)

Pathos. The "pathetic proof" or *pathos*[34] depends upon "putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind" (*ton akroaten diatheinai poos*) through the speech (1.2.3). Its influence rests on the fact that the *pathe* (emotions) into which the judge is plunged, such as *orge* (anger) and *eleos* (pity), influence his judgment (1.2.5 and 2.1.4 and 8). For instance, if judges have come to like the accused, they are inclined to think that he has done little or no wrong; however, if they have come to dislike him, then the opposite is the case (2.1.4).

For the rousing (and soothing) of these emotions, Aristotle gives us rules in 2.2–11. Each complex of emotions is hereby viewed from three sides: 1) the condition of the persons who suffer the emotion, 2) the persons about whom one feels the emotion and 3) the motive. For example, pity can be felt 1) towards others by those who themselves have experienced adversity; 2) toward people who resemble ourselves (because of age, character, position and background) and 3) because of old age, disease and other motives (2.8).

Can we now form pathetical enthymemes with these guidelines (*topoi*[35])? What do these look like? Can these combine with logical and possibly ethical enthymemes? I must again reconstruct the vision of Aristotle because he leaves the precise application of the guidelines vague.[36]

Some guidance is offered by the final passages of several *pathe*, found in chapters 2.2 up to and with 4, 2.9 and 2.10, and 2.7.4. I previously used the ending of 2.4 to show that Aristotle most likely had thought of the enthymematic demonstration or refutation of *ethos* (e.g., goodwill). When we combine this passage with 2.7.4 and 2.9.16, we may conclude that an argument for a reason for experiencing or not experiencing an emotion can be constructed by aid of the guidelines for arousing *pathos*. If, for instance, it can be shown that the defendant in a court-case is responsible for wrath-rousing things, then that is a compelling reason for the judges to feel anger toward him (2.2.27). Inversely, one can mitigate anger by showing that these things were done involuntarily (2.3.17).

Hence, enthymematical argumentation plays an important part in the pathetic proof. The general structure of this kind of pathetic proof seems to be:

1) *premise*
   Our opposition has spoken in a conceited way about philosophy (2.2.13); such people deserve the anger of those who hold philosophy high.
2) *conclusion*
   You, who cherish philosophy, have every reason to feel anger.
3) *appearance of intended pathos*
   The audience feels anger.

The step from 1 to 2 is enthymematic and has been explicitly, or mostly implicitly, inserted into the argument by the speaker. The psychological step from 2 to 3 is made by the listener who feels emotionally involved. This rational form of psychology is approved by Aristotle.[37]

If this analysis is correct, then the pathetic proof does not combine with the logical proof. While enthymematic argumentation can play a deciding role in the pathethic proof, this argumentation provides a different conclusion than when enthymematic argumentation is used in a logical proof. With *pathos*, the argumentative appeal to the emotions in the conclusion matters: "You judges have good/no reason to feel an emotion". With *logos*, the argument in the conclusion relates to the essential issue: Is the policy advantageous? etc. Of course, in practice, the pathetic argument can and will indicate the *ethos* of the speaker.

In this case, we also seem to arrive at a solution which Aristotle clearly discards. Just as he warns against the combination of the enthymeme and *ethos*, so he cautions against combining the enthymeme and *pathos*: "And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their mutual destruction or weakening" (3.17.8). However, in 3.17, Aristotle treats the *argumentatio*, which is directed toward the central issue; the logical enthymeme belongs within this framework. Logical enthymemes, the real ones as long as we recognize both form and matter, must not be confused with enthymemes directed toward the arousing of emotions that belong to the *peroratio*.

With all references considered, I have reached a rather complex conclusion. The traditional viewpoint, as well as the standpoint of Grimaldi, is too simplistic, while both viewpoints possess elements of truth and untruth. The logical proof must, I think, be made equal to the enthymematic disputation of a perspective on the central issue. With ethical and pathetic proof, one can also argue enthymematically, but the argumentation in this case does not have (direct) bearing upon the central issue; rather, it influences respectively the speaker's *ethos* and (reasons for) the audience's *pathos*. Indexical forms of *ethos* can be combined with *logos* as well as with *pathos*.

3. THE EVALUATION OF ETHOS AND PATHOS

Aristotle's judgment on the use of *ethos* and *pathos* must be seen in the light of the notorious duality of the *Rhetoric*. On one hand, *normative* criticism is levelled at the then-current theory and practice which contained (directives about) the play on judges' emotions (1.3.3–4), the use of non-argumentative parts of the speech (1.1.9 and 3.14.8) and persuasive style and delivery (3.1.4–6). On the other hand, the *Rhetoric* is, except for this marginally normative comment, a nearly totally, descriptive treatise of the means of persuasion which in the then-prevalent practice was required to produce an effect. One can explain it in this way: With his normative, marginal notes, Aristotle based the *Rhetoric* on the ideal oratory situation, although with his descriptive explanation, he used the real oratory situation of his time.[38]

The first situation is characterized by a "code of conduct for rational discussiants": a judicial procedure which avoids "irrelevant" (*ou peri tou pragmatos*) remarks, for instance, in order to antagonize the judges against the opposing advocate (1.1.4); well administered states possess such procedures (1.1.5). Furthermore, the judges, in this ideal case, limit themselves to the proof and do not allow themselves to be distracted by a pleasant presentation (3.1.5–6) or introduction outside the question (3.14.8).[39] When these two conditions are satisfied, then only normatively acceptable means are effective. Here, effectiveness and acceptability combine.

As a consequence of the inferiority of states and listeners (3.1.4 and 6 and 3.14.8) in practice, both procedures and judges often betray shortcomings.[40] The procedures do not go against unessential digressions and the judges allow themselves to be roused by this. In this situation the speaker does not succeed with only rational means – effectiveness and acceptability are not identical. Therefore, in principle, Aristotle deems the unacceptable means, "not as being right, but necessary," as says the Loeb-translation of a crucial turn of phrase in 3.1.5. According to Aristotle, rhetoric must ultimately be effective in real situations. (This is no cynicism but it puts the responsibility for the use of rhetorical means outside the rhetorical system, with the orator.)[41]

How does one put *ethos* and *pathos* into this framework? We are inclined to think that Aristotle looks upon these means of persuasion as a necessary evil in a far-from-ideal, oratory situation. Ideally, only *logos*, argumentation directed to the central issue, might be used because *ethos* and *pathos* appear clearly *exo tou pragmatos*, to be outside the case.[42]

There is something to be said for this interpretation. In 1.1.4 Aristotle claims that rousing a prejudice (*diabole*), pity (*eleos*), or anger (*orge*) is an impertinent way to play on the feelings of the judges; he again discusses prejudice in 3.14.8.[43] Attacking someone's *ethos* via a personal attack and mobilizing feelings like pity and anger are also objectionable in principle and unusable in an ideal situation. The treatment of the same means (3.15, 2.8 and 2.2) appears to have as its starting-point the real oratory situation of his time.

However, the issue is more intricate. First, Aristotle nowhere condemns the

(inevitable[44]) use of *ethos*. Secondly, he gives an explanation for the use of *ethos* and *pathos* which makes it doubtful if one can do without these means even in an ideal situation. In 2.1.2 he says, in rhetoric, *ethos* and *pathos* have to be treated equally with *logos*, because the object of rhetoric is judgment (*krisis*). Accoding to Aristotle's philosophy, judgment does not take place on rational grounds alone. With judgment, a choice is made which is determined not only by reason, but also by the appetition of the decider. Therefore, the speaker who addresses himself to a *krites* cannot confine himself solely to an appeal to reason even though there is an ideal procedure and a rational judge.[45]

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not enter into this justification of *ethos* and *pathos* in the *Rhetoric*. Therefore it is not clear if even in an ideal situation he deems *ethos* and *pathos* to be indispensable, as an inevitable consequence of the human condition. On the whole, one gets the impression that he sees *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* on a sliding scale, of which the extremes are not reached (see Figure 2):


ideal situaton:	real situation:
good procedure and	bad procedure and
rational judges	irrational judges

Figure 2.

Of course, this suggestion needs further investigation by putting the *Rhetoric* in the context of Aristotle's philosophical works.[46]

NOTES

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[1] Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, 'Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective,' *Argumentation* 1 (1987), 283–301, 286–287.
[2] Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*. 2nd Ed. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1978, 74. This second edition contains a reference to Grimaldi 1972 (see note 7), which suggests that Ehininger and Brockriede follow Grimaldi's interpretation of the *Rhetoric*.
[3] Ehninger and Brockriede, 85 and 88.
[4] Ehninger and Brockriede, 89–91.
[5] To these adherents belong, amongst others, Edward M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1867, and Wilhelm Süss, *Ethos. Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik*, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910. For recent discussions of the 'traditional exegesis' see Manfred J. Lossau, *Pros krisin tina politiken. Untersuchungen zur aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, and

Jürgen Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik.* Göttingen: Vanden-hoeck & Ruprecht, 1982 (see Lossau 48–52 and 102 for a shading of the typifying 'traditional exegesis', which is taken from Grimaldi 1972, 57 and 62: see note 7).

[6] According to Aristotle, rhetorical argumentation is equal to the use of enthymemes (paradigms are sub-types of enthymemes: see note 13). Enthymemes are rhetorical syllogisms; they are usually – but not invariably – truncated syllogisms, generally – but not inevitably – consisting of probable premises and conclusions (*Rhetoric* 1.2.11–19: see Sprute and M.H. Wörner, 'Enthymem – ein Rückgriff auf Aristoteles in systematischer Absicht,' in: G. Ballweg and Th.M. Siebert (eds.), *Rhetorische Rechtstheorie*, zum 75. Geburtstag von Theodor Viehweg. Freiburg/München, 1982, 73–98). For a different interpretation see Eugene E. Ryan, *Aristotle's Theory of Rhetorical Argumentation.* Montréal: Les Éditions Bellarmin, 1984.

[7] In 1972 Grimaldi produced a collection of articles in which this idea is central: William M.A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aritsotle's Rhetoric.* Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1972. He adheres to this view in his new commentary (*Aristotle. Rhetoric I. A Commentary.* New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), which attempts to replace Edward M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, Ed. with a Commentary, Rev. by John E. Sandys, I-III. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1877.

[8] I follow Rudolf Kassel (ed.) *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976 (the translations have been taken from John Henry Freese, Aristotle, *The 'Art' of Rhetoric*, with an English translation. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1926). Concerning the transmitting of the text I side with Sprute, 27 and Ryan, 19: until the opposite is proven, I take it that the text as we know it is from Aristotle himself, and that despite all kinds of textual problems it is meant to be a coherent and consistent whole.

[9] In his thesis "dass das Enthymem allein der logischen *pistis* gilt" (109) Lossau, 113–114 unduly capitalizes upon the second and fourth passage.

[10] It is a wide-spread tradition to define the three *pisteis entechnoi* as "proof". This is unfortunate, for *pistis* here means "that which brings about belief" – which is not necessarily proof. See Sprute, 57–61 with criticism at Grimaldi 1972 in which three meanings of *pistis* are defended.

[11] See Cope/Sandys and Grimaldi 1980 *ad loc.*

[12] Kassel, 11, is the sole editor – Grimaldi 1980 *ad loc.* – who conjectures that this passage was inserted later, perhaps by Aristotle himself. Grimaldi 1980, 353, acknow-ledges that this passage refutes his ideas; his defense is rather unsatisfactory, as he neglects the fact that the paradigm is a sub-type of the enthymeme (see next note).

[13] See Wörner, 86–89 and Sprute, 80–88. For a different interpretation see Ryan, ch. 3.

[14] In a narrow sense *apodeixis* means "strict scientific syllogistic proof", in a wider sense it is used in the *Rhetoric* to include non-scientific proof (see Cope/Sandys I,19 and Grimaldi 1980, 21).

[15] This is often observed in philological studies, for instance in Süss, 158. Relevant places in the *Rhetoric* are: 1.3.1 (classification in three types of speech), 1.10.2 (crime analysis), 2.1.5 (*ethos* analysis), 2.1.9 (*pathos* analysis) and 3.7.1 (*prepon* analysis).

[16] See Cope/Sandys and Grimaldi *ad loc.*

[17] See Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Lysias* 16 ff. (Compare Cope/Sandys I, 28 and Süss, 129–131 and 145, Grimaldi 1972, 63 and 1980, 39–40 and 352 and Lossau, 50.

[18] Compare Lossau, 112–113 (in which it is erroneously conceived as argument for the thesis that only *logos* is enthymematic (see note 9).

[19] Other manifestations of *ethos* are: 1) the *ethos* of the accused (from which one can argue his crime: 1.10.10), 2) the *ethos* or 'ideology of forms of government such as democracy, aristocracy etc. (1.8.6), 3) the *ethos* of the audience determined by age and prosperity (2.12–17), 4) the dramatic *ethos*: style and character must be characteristic of the speaker or represented persons (3.7.6 and 3.16). (Compare the classification in Cope, 108–113; Süss, 2 and 158; William M. Sattler 'Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient

Rhetoric,' *Speech Monographs* 14 (1947), 55–65, 57–61 and George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973, 91–93.) There are several connections between these manifestations of *ethos* and the *ethos* of the speaker. Yet, they should not be confused, as for instance Grimaldi does.

20 See especially Süss, 126 ff.

21 It is uncertain what 2.1.8 refers to; generally, opinions differ as to where Aristotle discusses the ethical proof. Cope, 112, Süss, 149 ff. and Antje Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973, 260, amongst others, say that this proof is not discussed in 2.12–17, but in 2.1 plus 1.9 and 2.4 (as does Grimaldi 1980, 38, 71 and 351). Lossau, 143 ff. is – at least partly – justified to include 2.12–17 in the discussion of *ethos* (see my note 28).

22 Süss, 200–203 and 245–254 and Kennedy, 91.

23 Sprute, 163–164 contains a closer analysis of the implicit enthymematic character of the 'diabolical' guidelines.

24 See Cope, 299, n. 2 for this and Cope/Sandys III, 74–75.

25 This is how Sattler, 58 views the discussion of *ethos* in the *Rhetoric*. However, Aristotle himself does not explicitly develop this approach in this way.

26 Grimaldi on the whole differentiates far too little between *ethos* (and *pathos*) as material category (contents of premises) and stylistic greatness (style of premises); see for instance Grimaldi 1972, 50–51 and 1980, 355, especially the note.

27 Compare, next to Sattler, 60, the slightly deviating Cope, 110 and Süss, 150.

28 Cope, 110–111 does not see a connection between the adaptation of the speech to the political ideas, the age and well-being of the audience and the *ethos* of the speaker, although he admits that it is possible – though not probable – that this connection displays *ethos*, i.e. *eunoia*. With regard to the adaptation to political ideas, Aristotle himself says this in so many words, and with regard to the adaptation to the *ethe* of 2.12–17, it seems to fit on analogical grounds. Also see Sattler, 59, Hellwig's criticism, 251, n. 3, and elsewhere at Süss, Ryan, 178 and especially Elàine Fantham, 'Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos,' *Phoenix* 27 (1973), 262–275, 270 and Lossau 144–145 and 159–161.

29 Respectively in 3.7 and 17. The connection between this type of dramatic *ethos* and the *ethos* of the speaker is problematical: see, e.g., Sattler, 60–61 and Fantham, 271–272.

30 According to 2.21.2–6 are the *gnomai* parts of enthymemes. Grimaldi 1972, 141–144 claims that this supports his point of view; in fact, it only shows that *ethos* (and pathetical style) can take the form of an enthymeme and not that these ethical enthymemes are at the same time logical, having a bearing on the central issue. However, the latter is not impossible, as is shown in the sequel to the main text.

31 Compare Lossau, 199.

32 This type of *ethos*-indicative enthymeme is in line, therefore, with what Ehninger and Brockriede call "pathetic" (see example at the beginning of the main text); the type of *ethos*-enthymeme displayed by these two does not appear in the *Rhetoric*: it rests on reputation which is not achieved through the speech as in Aristotelian *ethos*, but exists independently of the speech.

33 Sprute refers to this continually to refute Grimaldi. Lossau, 113, also uses this mistakenly to corroborate his thesis that *logos* alone is enthymematic.

34 As in the case of *ethos* – see note 19 – we must differentiate between several applications, such as the *pathos* of the accused, of the judging audience and of the presentation.

35 According to Thomas Conley, 'Pathe and pisteis: Aristotle 'Rhet.' II 2–11,' *Hermes* 110 (1982), 300–315, 304, 305, 309 and 310 also called *protaseis*, meaning enthymematical premises; however, see the announcement in 2.1.9 and the recapitulation in 2.18.2 in which there is no sign of it, nor is it mentioned in 2.22.16, which, moreover, ambiguates the term *enthymemata*. As a rule I don't see much in deriving an argument by means of terms such as *topos* and *protasis*: in the first place, they often appear in dubious (perhaps

non-Aristotelian) recapitulating passages and secondly they are notoriously ambiguous (especially *topos*: see Sprute).

[36] Süss, 159–163 does emphasize this. Like Hellwig, 234 and Conley, he explains that the guidelines in 2.2–17 can be used in two ways: because of the *pathe* and *ethe* of the accused one can use them in order to make it acceptable that he did whatever it is he is accused of, but one can also use the guidelines for true pathetic and ethical proof. I will only discuss the latter, which was definitely intended by Aristotle, and relevant.

[37] Compare the analysis in William W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions,' *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970), 40–70, Hellwig, M.H. Wörner, "Pathos' as Überzeugungsmittel in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles,' in: I. Craemer-Ruegenberg (ed.) *Pathos, Affekt, Gefühl*. Freiburg/München 1981, 53–78, 76 and Conley, 305 and 309.

[38] Also Sprute, 37–41 and 65–67; previously mentioned (albeit different) in, e.g., Cope, 4–6 and 140 and Hellwig, 107–109. Much has been written about this; a discussion of this issue falls outside the scope of this study (but see note 42).

[39] See the, sometimes diverging, comments in Cope/Sandys and Grimaldi 1980 *ad loc.*

[40] See previous note.

[41] Hellwig, 274–279.

[42] This is the traditional view which one finds for instance in Cope, 4 and 10 and Cope/Sandys I, 6. As opposed to this Grimaldi 1980, 9–10 sounds unconvincing. Lossau too, 198 ff., says that *ethos* and *pathos* and *pisteis entechnoi* cannot be *exo tou pragmatos*. The question is what does Aristotle mean exactly in connection with this frequent formula (I suggest: "not argumentative and not directed to the central issue"). I think that this question does not affect my argument.

[43] See the commentary in Cope/Sandys and Grimaldi 1980 *ad loc.* The latter's view that Aristotle does not discard with this every use of *ethos* and *pathos*, but leaves room for 'relevant' use, is not adequately explained; Lossau, 202, gives a better account.

[44] See note 31.

[45] In reference to passages in philosophical works Grimaldi 1972, 18–22 and 1980, 54–55, 81 and 350 is emphatic about this, probably rightly so, although Aristotle does not mention it at all in the *Rhetoric*.

[46] Compare Ryan, 175–177.