In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,
[I beseech] your succor our Lord![1]

THE SPEECH ABOUT RHETORICAL ARGUMENTS[1]

[INTRODUCTION]

(1) Since we have finished speaking about dialectical syllogisms and the extent of assent they provide, let us speak about persuasive things and the extent of assent they too provide. It is apparent that persuasion is a kind of probable supposition[1] which the soul trusts, despite its awareness of an opposing consideration. In what preceded, we already defined supposition.[2]

(2) From scrutiny and inductive investigation,[1] it appears that the things effecting persuasion can first be divided into two classes: one of them consists in arguments, and the second is external things[2] which are not arguments—like oaths, testimonies, and other things we will enumerate. Similarly, from scrutiny it also appears that the arguments used in public speaking[3] fall into two classes: example and proof. (In this art, the latter is called enthymeme.) That is because when someone advises[4] someone else to take a certain kind of medicine he says to him: "Use it because so-and-so used it, and it helped him." He thus persuades him by citing an example. Or he says to him: "You have a disease like this or like that." It is like that with every single thing concerning which people converse with one another.

(3) Since it has become apparent that this sort of speaking uses these two classes of arguments, we will speak about them first. Then, after that, we will go on to speak about the other persuasive things, for the former are more worthy of being considered persuasive than the latter and are prior by nature.

[THE ENTHYMEME]

(4) We say: the enthymeme is a syllogism leading to a conclusion which corresponds to unexamined opinion previously existing among

all or most people. Unexamined previously existing opinion is opinion which strikes a man as a probable supposition and which he trusts as soon as it occurs to him, even before he has examined it. Syllogisms become conclusive according to unexamined previously existing opinion either because of their forms or because of their matters.[1] This happens because of their forms when they are conclusive according to unexamined opinion. It happens because of their matters when their premises are true, once again according to unexamined opinion.

[Forms of Syllogisms]

(5) The forms of syllogisms become conclusive according to unexamined opinion by not being strict with regard to them and by omitting from them the thing which causes the conclusion to follow necessarily, the way the multitude is usually content [to do] when speaking to one another. Therefore, we ought to consider this notion in connection with each specific kind of syllogism we have enumerated;[1] for, by such an enumeration, we will arrive at the types of all the persuasive syllogisms with respect to their forms.

(6) Thus we say: from what has preceded it is clear that the universal premise[1] is what causes the conclusion to follow necessarily in the first figure[2] and that the conjunction[3] is caused by the minor premise[4] being affirmative. Since this is the case, if the major premise[5] is omitted or taken indefinitely the first figure will be persuasive. However, to omit it—as those engaged in demonstration do—is more persuasive, because omitting it may lead people to fancy: (a) that it was omitted because there was no point of contention about it and (b) that it is extremely clear. Similarly, in some instances the first figure may become persuasive by omitting the minor premise or by taking it negatively.[6]

(7) Since it is not clear at the outset which premise brings about the conclusion[1] nor which causes the conjunction in the second[2] and the third[3] figures, but it may be the minor premise or the major premise, there would be no harm in explicitly stating both premises in these two [figures]. But, when this is done and neither one has been omitted, both of them ought to be taken indefinitely; otherwise, no point of contention would remain in these two [figures] at all. Moreover, among the kinds of inconclusive combinations are those that are thought to be conclusive according to unexamined opinion without

really being so. Now these kinds of arguments are still persuasive because of their forms. An example of this is the combination of two affirmative [premises] in the second figure. Similarly, the conclusive types [of syllogisms] which are in the third figure are of this kind when their conclusions are taken in a universal manner.[4] However, in spite of this, one ought not to state the ellipsis in them explicitly but ought to take them indefinitely so that the point of contention in them might be more obscure.

(8) Conditional Syllogisms are disjunctive—as previously stated—and conjunctive. The conjunctive syllogism is made an enthymeme by leaving a point of contention in it also. It has already been explained in the *Prior Analytics*[1] that the conjunctive syllogism becomes conclusive when the consequence is valid and when the selected term[2] becomes evident by means of a categorical syllogism.[3] If the selected term is self-evident, the consequence must necessarily be explained. It was also explained there that the selected term and the conclusion cannot be just any chance conditional or conditioned term.[4] Since this is the case, this kind of syllogism is only made into an enthymeme by placing some of these restrictions upon it. However, it becomes persuasive primarily by the omission of the selected term. It may become persuasive regardless of which term—that is, the conditional or the conditioned term—or which of their contraries is brought forth as a conclusion. In spite of this, however, when there is an invalid conclusion, the selected term leading to it usually should not be stated explicitly for fear the opponent might notice it—like the man who selects the conditioned term itself and brings forth the conditional term as a conclusion or who selects the contrary of the conditional term and brings forth the contrary of the conditioned term as a conclusion.[5] Still, one might explicitly state the selected term in something like this, and the argument will be persuasive; e.g., the argument of one of the ancients: "If being is created, it has a beginning; but it is not created, thus it does not have a beginning."

(9) Galen[1] and many anatomists use this kind of syllogism to deduce the unknown causes of animal actions. For example, he says: "When the reflexive nerve is eliminated, the voice is eliminated; thus, when the reflexive nerve exists, the voice exists."[2] But it does not necessarily follow as stated: for when animals are eliminated, man is eliminated; yet, from the existence of animals, the existence of man does not necessarily follow.[3]

(10) In the instance when the conclusion [brought forth] is valid (for example, when it is the very opposite of the conditioned term or of the conditional term), one must not state the selected term explicitly. Otherwise, unless the conjunction is omitted and is not stated explicitly, no point of contention will remain in the argument.

(11) The disjunctive syllogism becomes persuasive when more than two opposing considerations exist and they are not all carefully examined or when all of the selected terms are not carefully examined. This syllogism does not become persuasive when the selected term is omitted; rather, when that is done, it remains in the very form in which one seeks to clarify one of the two antitheses into which the problem is divided.[1]

(12) The argument of Abū al-Ma'ālī [al-Juwaynī],[1] in his book called *The Spiritual Directive*[2] when he wanted to refute [the notion of] creation from the elements, is an example of that in which all of the opposing considerations are not carefully examined. For he said: "If a created thing were to have been brought into existence from the four elements, then that could not help but be (a) by means of some bodies intermixing with others until the mass came together in one place or (b) by each one of them independently and separately arising in the composition; and both of these classes [i.e., alternatives] are absurd. Thus, that there should be one being created from more than one element is absurd."[3] Now one thing which ought to have been set down in opposition in the syllogism has been eliminated from this argument, namely, that an existent thing may come into existence in the manner of a mixture, as is seen with oxymel[4] and with other artificial things.

(13) The type [of disjunctive syllogism] in which one begins with a negation and arrives at a negation only becomes persuasive when the selected term is omitted and the conclusion is stated explicitly. Indeed, when the selected term and the conclusion are both omitted, the hearer does not know which thing you intend to conclude. Here, it is not possible for the explicitly stated selected term to be any chance thing nor for it to be according to unexamined opinion; rather, it is always the assertion[1] which is selected and the negation which is brought forth as a conclusion. However, when that is done, no subject of persuasion remains in it.

(14) THE CONTRADICTORY SYLLOGISM.[1] If we wish the contradictory syllogism to be persuasive, the doubt-provoking subject and the consequent absurdity ought to be stated explicitly, while suppressing the premise from which the absurdity necessarily follows. Still, it might be explicitly stated when the consequence is not apparent. This would be like our argument: "If every man is not sentient, then every animal is not sentient; for every man is an animal."[2] This consequence is in the third figure.

(15) These are the classes of enthymemes according to their forms. They correspond absolutely to the classes of syllogisms.

[MATERIAL ASPECTS OF SYLLOGISMS]

(16) With respect to their matters, syllogisms should be divided into classes in the same way premises themselves are divided, especially the major premise, since it is the one which brings about the conclusion. With the minor premise, however, it is possible to pay no attention whatever to whether it is persuasive, generally accepted, or anything else.

(17) Thus we say that the premises used in this class of arguments, especially the major premise, are taken here insofar as they are generally accepted according to unexamined common opinion. In what preceded, we have defined what unexamined opinion is[1] and that dialectical premises are used only insofar as they are truly generally accepted.[2] Now just as generally accepted things may accidentally be true and may not, similarly, premises which are based on unexamined opinion may accidentally happen to be generally accepted or true and may not. However, in general, they are taken here insofar as they are generally accepted according to unexamined opinion, just as dialectical premises are taken solely insofar as they are truly generally accepted. What is generally accepted according to unexamined previously existing opinion is divided into (a) generally received propositions—and these are premises which are taken universally according to unexamined previously existing opinion—and into (b) sense perceptible things which are taken as proofs of other things, also according to unexamined opinion.

(18) Among these proofs are (a) those that are taken as proofs of the existence of a thing without restriction[1]—like our taking the empty vessel as proof of the existence of void—and (b) those that are taken as proofs of the existence of a predicate for a subject. When the latter are more universal than the subject and more particular than, or similar

to, the predicate, they belong in the first figure; these were specifically assigned the name "proof" by the ancients.[2] If they are more universal than the two extreme terms, they belong in the second figure. If they are more particular than both [of the extreme terms], they belong in the third [figure]. These latter two were specifically assigned the name "sign" by the ancients.[3] The proofs which are taken up here may be matters which are subsequent to the thing proved—e.g., its consequences—and they may be prior [to it]—e.g., its causes.

(19) Now each of the two classes of premises—the generally received propositions and the proofs—may occur in matters which are necessary, possible for the most part, and equally possible. An example of the generally received propositions occurring in the necessary matter is: "everything which is done has a doer." An example of those occurring in the matter which is possible for the most part is: "any sick person who obeys his passions and does not heed the saying of the doctors will not be cured." An example of those occurring in the equally possible is: "whatever is more agreeable and easier is preferable." However, in itself, this could be used to allege that the matter is not preferable.

(20) Proofs. The one in the necessary matter in the first figure which is what is specifically assigned the name "proof," is like our argument: "The brightness of the moon increases bit by bit, so it is spherical." What occurs in the matter which is possible for the most part is like our argument: "So-and-so is gathering men, preparing arms, and fortifying his towns. There is no enemy near him. He is, therefore, resolved upon revolting against authority." This was known among the ancients as "specious proof." Those occuring in the matter which is equally possible are like our argument: "So-and-so did not budge from his position, and all of his companions retreated so that he was felled. He is, therefore, courageous." However, in itself this may also be used as proof of the cowardice which prevents a man from fleeing. This proof, too, the ancients identified as "doubtful proof."[1]

(21) Signs. The ones occurring in the necessary matter in the second figure are like our argument: "The nerve grows out of the brain because it is implanted in it." What occurs in the matter which is possible for the most part is like our argument: "So-and-so showed the enemy the vulnerability of the town because he climbed up on the wall

and watched for the enemy, and the one who points out the vulnerability [of the town's walls] does that." Those occurring in the matter which is equally possible have the same force as the proofs which occur in this matter, since the universals in it have the same force as particulars and particulars may be converted and brought back to the first figure. So if they were taken universally, their falsity would be as great as the falsity of particulars. For this reason, the ancients rejected the type of signs which occur in this matter.

(22) Proofs which are in the third figure.[1] The ones in the necessary matter are like our argument: "Time is the celestial sphere, because all things are in time and all things are in the celestial sphere." Those occurring in the matter [which is possible for the] most part are like our argument: "Wise men are virtuous, because Socrates was a virtuous wise man." The reason for rejecting those occurring in the matter which is equally possible [in the third figure] is the very same reason for rejecting those in the second figure.

(23) You ought to be apprised that this division—i.e., the division into the necessary and the possible—is not essential to the premises of enthymemes inasmuch as they are premises of enthymemes. That is because the premises of enthymemes are taken insofar as they are generally received according to unexamined opinion—as we have said[1]—or insofar as they are signs and proofs according to unexamined opinion, not insofar as they occur in a necessary or possible matter. For it is with regard to demonstrative syllogisms that premises are taken according to this description; i.e., they are the ones which take premises insofar as they are necessary or possible for the most part. Those which are equally possible are thought to be more characteristic of these arguments, since the demonstrative art does not employ them. But this art—i.e., the art of rhetoric—does not employ them from the standpoint of their being equally possible either; for if it were to employ them from this standpoint, one thing would not be more likely to follow from them than would its opposite. Rather, they are used insofar as one of them preponderates, even if slightly, according to unexamined opinion, either at a certain moment or in a certain condition. Some people who were ignorant of this idea, denied that this art could employ a proof occurring in the matter which is equally possible, for they claimed that no persuasion is brought about by that which is equally possible.

(24) As has been said, this art does not have a particular subject, just as the art of dialectic does not have a particular subject. For the premises employed in these two arts are not grasped in the mind in the same way as they exist outside the mind. Rather, a predicate is always asserted to apply to a subject because of what is generally accepted, either according to unexamined opinion or according to the truth, not because it is of the nature of the predicate to apply to the subject or of the nature of the subject that the predicate should apply to it. Nor does this art only take premises insofar as they are widespread according to unexamined opinion, without qualifying them with regard to mode of existence. Rather, it may take the necessary as though it were possible according to unexamined opinion and, similarly, the possible as though it were necessary. As for taking the necessary as though it were possible, that is like someone who fancies that the heavens could possibly exist in another form and that it is possible for everything to be created out of any chanced-upon thing. As for imagining that something is impossible when it is possible, there are many things whose existence is not difficult when the beliefs of the multitude about them are considered. However, the kind of assent to which we have inclined since youth is that all things are possible—to the extent that the argument of anyone who says this thereby loses its necessary character. For instance, in Plato's confutation of Protagoras, when Protagoras said: "there is nothing that is perceived," Plato replied: "there, now, is something that is perceived" —meaning this assertion Protagoras had made.[1]

(25) Now we have finished what we were about. So let us go back to where we were and say that it appears likely that what compelled the ancients to divide the premises of enthymemes in accordance with their matters is that premises which are widespread according to unexamined opinion are invested with weakness and strength in accordance with each particular matter. For that reason, premises according to unexamined opinion are more persuasive when they happen to occur in the matter which is possible for the most part than when they occur in the equally possible. Now it has become clear from this argument how many classes of enthymeme there are from the standpoint of form and matter.

[THE EXAMPLE]

(26) We ought to speak about the example. There are [different] classes of the example. (a) With one, it is decided whether a predicate applies to a subject or does not apply to it because of that predicate applying to the likeness of that subject or because of it not applying, when it is better known whether the predicate applies to the likeness or not; like our argument that the heavens are created because the wall is created. (b) With another, we decide whether a predicate applies to a subject or does not apply to it because the likeness of that predicate applies to that subject or does not apply to it, when it is better known whether that likeness applies to the subject or does not apply; for example, our deciding that the heavens are changeable because of the fact that they move. (c) With yet another, we decide whether a predicate applies to a subject or does not apply to it because the likeness of that predicate applies to the likeness of that subject or does not apply to it, when it is better known that the likeness of the predicate applies to the likeness of that subject or when it is better known that it does not apply; for example, "honey dilutes because sugar dissolves."

(27) The judgment may be universal, while the likeness is particular, e.g., our argument: "Pleasures are bad because wine is bad." Now the difference between this and induction is that in induction we confirm the universal by the particular, whereas here we confirm one thing by another insofar as it is a likeness—not insofar as one of them is particular and the other universal.

(28) Likeness. There are two classes: either a likeness in a common matter or a likeness by analogy. An example of the likeness in a common matter is what preceded. An example of the likeness by analogy is our argument: "The king in the city is like the deity in the world, and just as the deity is one, so too ought the king to be."

(29) In general, regardless of the example, judgment about a particular based on a universal does not occur in it, because neither one of the two similar things is more general than the other. Nor do they exist as similars in this respect. It is clear from what preceded in the *Prior Analytics*[1] that the apodeictically conclusive speech is the one in which the particular is explained by the universal. Since that is the case, no other argument follows apodeictically from the example, nor is it essentially conclusive. An example of that is our deciding

that the heavens are created due to their similarity to created bodies with respect to extension, alteration, connectedness, and other things. For the heavens in this argument are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the problem;[2] being created is the major term, since it is the predicate of the problem; and the middle term is extension and alteration. Now when we compose the syllogism, we speak in this manner: "The heavens have extension, and what has extension is created, thus the heavens are created."

(30) However, it is not sufficient that our saying "what has extension is created," be taken indefinitely, if we want "the heavens" to be encompassed apodeictically under it; rather, we should even take it universally, i.e., "every extended thing is created." Now if this universal had resulted from our scrutiny of some extended things in the way particular premises result, then to state it explicitly by an example would be superfluous—unless it were taken as a means of instruction and guidance for bringing about certainty concerning the universal. But if our having perceived some of the extended things as created did not lead us to universal certainty and this premise remained indefinite for us, nothing would result necessarily from our perceiving it—except according to unexamined opinion. From this it appears: (a) that with regard to these kinds of premises, certainty about the universal is not attained by sense perception but by another power, since by sense perception only individual instances of a limited number are discerned and (b) that the ranks of supposition[1] are in accordance with their nearness and their distance from this universal decision. In general, supposition is a universal judgment based on sense perception alone.

(31) Because one of the later dialectical theologians[1]—and he is the one called Abū al-Ma'ālī [al-Juwaynī]—was not aware of this, he said: "The example provides certainty as a means of guidance, not only as a way toward the syllogism and scrutiny."[2] However, since he did not speak of the syllogism of a valid figure, it would follow for him that all of the sciences are preexistent. Thus, nothing would be known by means of the syllogism, so that it could happen, for example, that a man who has not theoretically investigated anything at all relating to geometry would be able to read the *Book of the al-Magest*[3] and that the origin of the world would be self-evident.

(32) The rank of the example with regard to assent has now been explained. In this art it corresponds to the induction in dialectic, just as the enthymeme here corresponds to the syllogism in dialectic.

[PERSUASIVE THINGS WHICH DO NOT OCCUR BY ARGUMENTS]

(33) After this, we ought to proceed to speak about the persuasive things which do not occur by arguments and about the extent of assent they provide. All together, there are thirteen kinds of persuasive things:[1]

[1]. Among them is [proclaiming] the virtue of the speaker and the defect of his opponent, for it is clear that by this a man acquires a good reputation and acceptance of what he is saying.

[2]. Among them is bringing the listeners around to assent by means of the passions; for example, strengthening the passions in the soul of the listener so that he must assent because of fanaticism, mercy, fear, or anger. Now it is evident that this also inclines a man to assent.

[3]. Among them is what inclines the listeners by means of moral speeches; this is done, just as Galen used to do, by making them imagine that the chaste, the people of preeminent character, and those who are neither sullied by corrupt thought nor false [in their thoughts] accept their speech.

[4]. Among them is extolling and belittling the matter which is spoken about, for when the speech is extolled, the soul is more inclined to it. On the contrary, when it is deprecated, the soul avoids it; and no inclination for it takes place.

[5]. Among them is consensus.

[6]. Among them are testimonies.

[7]. Among them is awakening a desire for, or apprehension about, something.

[8]. Among them is challenging and betting.

[9]. Among them are oaths.

[10]. Among them is for the quality of the speech, the voice, and the inflection to be in such a condition that they cause the existence of the matter whose affirmation is desired to be imagined; for example,

someone whose face has already become pale and whose voice has already risen recounting a fearful matter.

[11]. Among them is distorting speeches and dropping much from them and putting them into a form in which their repulsiveness appears and opposition to them is simplified; now these enter more into sophistry than they do into rhetoric.

These, then, are all of the external persuasive things.

(34) With many of these, it is immediately evident that they only provide persuasion; with others, that may be somewhat obscure. We will speak about the latter.

[Testimony]

(35) Testimony holds the most powerful rank. In general, testimony is a certain kind of report. Those who bring the report can either be one or more than one. When they are more than one, they may either be a group which it is possible to enumerate or they may be a group which it is not possible to enumerate. Things reported are either perceived by the senses or intellectually apprehended. Those who report things perceived by the senses are either those who have perceived these things themselves or those who report them from others like, fewer, or more numerous than themselves. Now things perceived by the senses which are reported either concern past matters that we have not perceived or matters occurring in the present but absent from us.[1]

(36) Reports about those things we have perceived by the senses are of no use or benefit. It seems this is likewise the case concerning intellectually apprehended things for those practitioners of arts whose habit it is to deduce such intellectually apprehended things in their art. For the multitude, however, testimony about them may possibly bring about persuasion. For this reason, you will find that the sect among the people of our religious community known as the dialectical theologians does not limit itself only to the testimony of the Legislator [Muḥammad] concerning knowledge of the origin of the world, the existence of the Creator, and other things; rather, concerning knowledge of that, it also employs syllogisms. Now the sect known as the *Ḥashawīyāh*[1] rejects that.

(37) Assent to testimonies and reports of sense-perceived matters which have not been witnessed is strengthened and weakened in accordance with the number of the reporters and other considerations relating to them. Thus, the most powerful assent resulting from reports is what a group which cannot be enumerated reports it has perceived or what a group reports on the authority of another group which cannot be enumerated but which has perceived it. Now it [powerful assent about the report] is like that, however much the group increases in size, to whatever extent it reaches, if in the beginning, the middle, and the end it remains the same in that determining their number is either impossible or difficult. This class of reports is the one that is called continuous tradition.[1]

(38) Certainty with regard to diverse matters—like the sending of the Prophet, the existence of Mecca and Medina, and other things—may result from this. But we should theoretically investigate the manner in which this results, for there are some things that produce assent essentially and some accidentally. Now it is clear that assent about the existence of sense-perceived matters results, primarily and essentially, through sensation. Thus, whoever loses some kind of sense, loses some kind of sense perception. Nor does [assent to] the existence of sense-perceived things result essentially only through sensation; indeed, it may also result through an imaginative representation of them according to their essence.[1] Then, too, certainty about the essential existence of sense-perceived things may result through the syllogism; an example of that is: "This wall is built; thus, it has a builder." However, the essential form of the particular builder does not result through it.

(39) Certainty may be obtained about the existence of sense-perceived matters which have never been perceived and whose existence we have no way of apprehending by means of a syllogism, but very seldom—just as we very seldom manage to conceive of them according to their essence.[1] However, even if individual instances of such matters cannot be distinguished by sensation, there is no doubt but what their names or what indicates them can be distinguished by it. Now for the greater number of people, assent to something like this comes about by means of the continuous tradition and exhaustive reports.[2] However, it is clear that this is an accidental effect, because that about them which brings about assent rarely follows from what

is presumed[3] to be its cause, namely, the reports—just as effects[4] rarely follow from their accidental causes.[5]

(40) In this science, it is not necessary to dwell upon the cause for this accidental certainty resulting nor upon how it results; for it has already been spoken about in *Sense and Sensible Objects*.[1] When some people became aware of this, they wanted to set down as conditions for reports a specific number from which certainty would result essentially. When this did not succeed for them, they said: "In itself it results, even if it does not happen for us." Now this is a clear falsification, for if there were some essential number which would lead to certainty, continuous accounts with respect to the number of reporters would not vary, and it would be possible to perceive and to grasp this number. But the many and the few are closely related. Thus, when some of them wanted to set down conditions with regard to the continuous tradition which would lead to certainty and they did not succeed at it, they said; "One of its conditions is that it lead to certainty." Since that is the case, there is no condition at all which could be set down and no means by which certainty could result essentially. Now this art employs the reports and the testimonies in the manner in which they are taken for the most part, which is according to supposition. For it is very seldom concerned with something which no art employs at all.

[Recorded Traditions]

(41) The situation with regard to quoting recorded traditions is also clear; however, whatever assent to them results because of being brought up with them or because of habit is very powerful. Thus, you see many who are brought up according to the ignorant ways of life believing fables from which we are not able to turn them away.

[Consensus]

(42) The foundation for the persuasiveness of consensus—which is the mutual understanding of the people of the religious community and their agreement about something pertaining to the religious community—is the Divine Law's testimony to them about their infallibility.[1] When a group of people became aware of this they said: "He who departs from consensus is not an infidel." Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] explicitly[2] stated this idea about consensus in the first part of his book called *The Distinction Between Islam and Atheism*.[3] He said: "What consensus is has not yet been agreed upon."[4]

[Challenging]

(43) A challenge may be made by means of different things. However, the most persuasive of challenges is the one that is made by means of the completely unprecedented miracle, i.e., by the performance of something considered impossible by mankind. But it is obvious, even if the feat is extremely marvelous, that it provides nothing more than good opinion[1] about the one who performs the feat or nothing more than trust in him and in his excellence when the feat is divine. Now Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] has explicitly stated this in his book called *The Balance*.[2] He said: "Faith in the Messengers [i.e., the Prophets] by the way of the miracle, as the dialectical theologians have described it, is the popular way; and the way of the select few is other than this."[3]

(44) These external matters which we have enumerated are the ones from which it is supposed that certainty will result. The persuasiveness of the others is self-evident. Now the enthymemes are more noble and take precedence over these, because they may be used to establish those which are neither clearly existent nor clearly persuasive. For example, when the moral excellence of the speaker is neither evident nor generally accepted, they are used to make it evident. Similarly, when someone supposes that he who claims to be a miracle-worker is not a miracle-worker, they are used to make it clear to him that he is a miracle-worker. The same holds with testimonies, traditions, and other things when the opponent contests them. All of these persuasive things —whether they be arguments or external matters—may be used in all of the reflective arts in the way that those ancients who preceded used to use them, because they supposed that they were ways to certainty.

[CONCLUSION]

(45) When Aristotle became aware of the rank of these [arguments and external things] with regard to assent, he saw that these things which bring about assent were valuable because the multitude used

them with one another for particular voluntary things which judges decide are good or bad. Among the voluntary things which judges decide are good or bad, some are to be found in a man himself and in the present time; these are virtues and vices. Some are to be found in the present time in another person; that is injustice and justice. Some will occur to him in the future; these are useful and harmful matters. Now speech addressed to others about the first kind of things is called contradictory [epideictic];[1] when it is about the second kind of things, it is called forensic;[2] and when it is about the third kind of things, it is called deliberative.[3] Moreover, to the extent that man is a social being and a citizen, he necessarily uses rhetorical arguments about these three categories of things. [Once he recognized all of this,] Aristotle began[4] to set forth rules and things which would enable a man to persuade about each and every one of these things in the best possible manner with regard to that thing. Therefore, this art is defined as being the means by which man is able to effect persuasion about each and every one of the particular matters and to do so in the most complete and most artful manner possible with regard to each thing.

(46) Now we have said enough for our purposes.

All of the *Rhetoric* is completed. Praise be to God the Exalted.

Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Poetics"